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Constitution law researcher Guy Powles, a Pakeha New 
Zealander residing in Australia was not optimistic accurate 
predictions on “the [Tonga] election which is coming up now in 
November” could be made (Garrett, 2014).  “A man would be a 
fool to try to guess just where the balance will finish up,” he 
uttered to Jemima Garrett interviewing him for Radio Australia 
on April 30th 2014 (Garrett, 2014).  Picturing the general 
election seven months away on November 27th 2014, Powles 
thought devolving the monarch’s executive powers to 
government by constitutional reform was Tonga’s priority.  
Whether it would end up an election issue deciding which way 
the public voted was a different story, and one he was not 
willing to take a punt on. 
While Tongans and non-Tongan observers focused 
attention on guessing who would get into parliament and have 
a chance at forming a government after votes had been casted 
in the November election, the trying political conditions the 
state functioned, floundered, and fell in, were overlooked.  It 
was as if the Tongans and Palangi (white, European) 
commentators naively thought changing government would 
alter the internationally dictated circumstances a small island 
developing state was forced to work under. 
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Nineteen years ago, Maltese professor of economics Lino 
Briguglio spelled out the vulnerabilities that small island 
states in pursuit of economic development were subject to, 
and subjugated by.  His 1995 essay is wholly relevant today.   
 
Small size creates problems with public 
administration.  An outcome of this is that SIDS [small 
island developing states] have to rely on larger states, 
generally the ex-colonizing country, for specialized 
aspects of public administration.  A related problem is 
that many government functions tend to be very 
expensive per capita when the population is small.  For 
example, overseas diplomatic missions of small island 
states are often unmanned.  Another public 
administration problem in SIDS is that people know 
each other well, and are often related to each other.  
This tends to work against impartiality and efficiency in 
the civil service and against a merit-based recruitment 
and promotions policy. (Briguglio, 1995, p. 1617). 
 
This essay unravels a Tongan story about minerals and 
cucumbers in the sea, a descriptor for the political spectrum of 
noblemen and commoners standing for election to parliament 
in 2014.  It asks a simple question.  Will international or 
internal relations transform the Tongan state?  The evidence 
points to international relations as the dominant driver 
altering Pacific Island states.  However, Tongans alongside 
Palangi writing about Tonga are absorbed by internal politics, 
seeing this as the root of reform.  The riddle of reforming 
Tonga to become what, exactly, has been confoundedly 
theorised by political actors and little understood by the 
masses. 
My paper notes how Tongan politicians and the public are 
swayed by the bike shed effect, a state bureaucracy condition 
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where Cyril Northcote Parkinson argued bureaucrats and 
organisations give more weight to triviality over important 
subjects (Northcote Parkinson, 1957).  In a nutshell, I contend 
that Tongans are obsessed with, and surmise about, trifling 
affairs with regard to national politics.  Conversely, the things 
that really matter, such as international relations 
transforming how the state operates and the polity and 
economy of the Pacific Islands region, are too involved to 
fathom from garnering a government press release, a media 
sound-bite, and a parliamentary debate aired free on public 
radio. 
 
Politicians behaving badly 
If ever there was a scrambled translation of Tongan history in 
the political present, then Sitiveni Halapua was the teller of 
tales.  He translated the Tongan term “Kafataha” to mean a 
“Cabinet of National Unity,” and ran with his invention to 
show the public (The Tonga Herald, 2014b).  He got on radio 
and in the newspaper talking up a storm on Kafataha.  But 
Kafataha was not a social referent to the state’s national 
executive, a cabinet of ministers.  Just as the term’s root word 
Kafa, meaning a sennit rope braided from coconut fibre, had 
no practical use for governing the country; not unless Halapua 
was pointing out Tongans wore ta’ovala, meaning mats around 
their waists in parliament requiring a rope to tie it up.   
If he was attempting metaphorical dexterity by stretching 
the rope of human imagination to get his Kafataha cabinet of 
national unity figure of speech, it did not work at tying up 
political loose ends.  If anything, when it came to the dismal 
fall-out between Halapua and his Democratic Party leader 
‘Akilisi Pohiva, and the fact Halapua was dumped by Pohiva 
from the party list of candidates running in the 2014 election, 
Kafataha had uncoiled against him.  The rope came undone, 
tripping up Halapua in full flight of Kafataha speechmaking. 
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The Tonga Herald gave a description of what this website 
thought “Kafataha” or “Cabinet of National Unity” meant in 
practice (The Tonga Herald, 2014b). 
 
Halapua’s slogan was “Kafataha” or “Cabinet of 
National Unity.”  It was a strategy to reel Nobles and 
non-PTOA representatives into a broad power-sharing 
deal, and would have provided an in-road for the PTOA 
to take the reins of government. (The Tonga Herald, 
2014b). 
 
Kafataha “was a strategy” for “a broad power-sharing deal” 
to govern Tonga (The Tonga Herald, 2014b).  Kalino Latu for 
the Tongan news website New Zealand Kaniva Pacific 
concurred with The Tonga Herald caption.  The idea of “a 
broad power-sharing deal” correlated with “a coalition” 
government of parliamentarians from both class divisions, the 
people’s and the nobles’ representatives (The Tonga Herald, 
2014b; Latu, 2014d). 
 
Under Halapua’s proposal all parliamentarians 
would work together as a coalition.  According to 
Halapua, members would have a conscience vote and 
could vote against their caucus.  The gist of the idea 
was there would be no need for an opposition party 
because, in Dr Halapua’s words, all parliamentarians 
would work according to principles of love, honesty and 
peace. (Latu, 2014d). 
  
‘Akilisi Pohiva had a different spin.  The Democratic Party 
leader read Kafataha as a “political doctrine,” and one that 
was rumoured to be incompatible with the party line, which 
was said to be the reason behind Halapua getting dropped 
from the party register (Radio New Zealand, 2014c). 
Minerals and Cucumbers in the Sea 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
387 
 
It is a pity, the difference between Steven Halapua 
and myself but we can’t afford, at this point in time, to 
come into the House with two different political 
doctrines because when we come to formulate policies 
we have to have only one. (‘Akilisi Pohiva cited in Radio 
New Zealand, 2014c). 
 
Then there was Halapua’s angle.  To Radio New Zealand 
International, he inferred that “coalitions” offered an English 
language simile for understanding how Kafataha functions 
(Radio New Zealand, 2014b).  By this, coalition government 
was a political arrangement he had noticed taking place in 
“other Commonwealth countries,” and naturally deduced why 
not Tonga too (Radio New Zealand, 2014b). 
 
The idea of one party – win and get the majority 
and run everything – I think it is an old fashioned way 
of thinking.  The world has changed and I have seen 
that in New Zealand, in Australia and in other 
Commonwealth countries where it is important for 
people to think about forming coalitions. (Sitiveni 
Halapua cited in Radio New Zealand, 2014b). 
 
In the exact same radio interview, Halapua switched boats 
in midstream by saying no, “the word coalition” was not what 
he meant at all (Radio New Zealand, 2014a).  He did not “want 
to use the word coalition” for Kafataha because Kafataha 
alluded to “working towards some common goal … negotiated 
with others,” which by and large echoed the logic holding 
together a coalition government in Commonwealth states 
(Radio New Zealand, 2014a). 
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It is about building, development and working 
towards some common goal and that common goal has 
to be negotiated with others who are willing to work 
with us, and that is why I use the word ‘kafataha.’  I 
don’t want to use the word coalition because we don’t 
have a party system. (Radio New Zealand, 2014a). 
 
Halapua had gotten his Kafataha in a twist.  I mean to 
say, his conniving on how to form a government and be central 
to its composition wedged him in the age-old riddle of which 
came first, the chicken or the egg?  Which do we sort out first, 
party candidates for the election or ministers for an incoming 
cabinet?  What gets publicised first, the party policies or a 
cabinet of national unity charter?  What campaign gets 
pushed first, the party leader or nominations for prime 
minister? 
A Tongan economist who lived in Hawai’i, America while 
employed at the East-West Center in Honolulu for a number of 
years, Halapua had direct social memory of the United States 
as a federal constitutional republic.  He knew American 
democracy was buttressed by two major political parties, the 
Democratic Party and the Republican Party, which formed the 
legislature’s two chambers of Congress, the Senate and the 
House of Representatives.   
Moreover, he had an inkling that political parties did not 
overrule American democracy.  The enormity and complexity of 
running fifty states and one federal district making up a large 
country with the population size of 313.9 million people was 
controlled by multiple governments at federal, state, and local 
municipal and district levels.  What ruled the roost was not 
different party doctrines competing to influence the state, but 
government and “governmentality,” which meant the act of 
governing (Foucault, 1988, 2004). 
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When speaking from his small island developing state of 
birth, he wrote off Tonga as not practicing “a party system” by 
any way, shape, or form (Radio New Zealand, 2014a).  This 
was not true, and nor was the Kafataha crusade ethical and 
practicable in its will to mobilise state governance towards 
thinking that in Tonga, “there would be no need for an 
opposition party” in parliament (Latu, 2014d). 
Had Halapua been a political scientist, instead of an 
economist, he would have known that systematic power 
designed to annihilate political opposition and civil forms of 
organised resistance encompassed a host of names such as 
tyranny, despotism, dictatorship, totalitarianism, and 
autocracy.  Sometimes, wiping out “an opposition party” from 
the political structure was called martial law and military 
junta, especially when executed by organisations of an 
extreme nationalist or religious fundamentalist nature. 
The Kingdom of Tonga was none of these.  Therefore, why 
call for nationalist regression, aggression, and oppression as 
Tonga’s way forward?  Preposterously, why try to make out 
taking away the “need for an opposition party” was a just 
political act exemplifying higher “principles of love, honesty 
and peace” (Latu, 2014d).  Halapua was talking in circles, and 
in the long-winded moment his Kafataha had wound up with 
haphazard ideas that did not tie together rationally. 
Officially, Tonga had five registered political parties from 
the commoner class that had contested various elections; the 
longest running being the Human Rights and Democracy 
Movement instituted in 1992 of which the former Prime 
Minister from 2006 to 2010 Feleti Sevele was a member 
elected to parliament in the 2005 election, along with six 
others of this party. 
The Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands led by ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva was formalised in 2010 two months before the election, 
originally taking out twelve of the seventeen people’s 
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representatives seats.  Now it was trimmed down a tad with 
Sangster Saulala exiting the party to join the Tu’ivakano 
government as an independent member of parliament.  Then 
recently four parliamentarians, including Halapua, were 
chopped as candidates for the 2014 election.  On top of that 
pile was the deputy leader, ‘Isileli Pulu, who according to the 
New Zealand Kaniva Pacific website, got the boot from the 
party leader.  Hence, it was tricky to estimate how they would 
fear at the polls second time around. 
It was not as Halapua said that “we don’t have a party 
system” in Tonga, but rather, the class group who mobilised 
effectively as a political party was the nobility.  The nine 
nobles’ representatives to the legislative assembly practiced an 
established set of party principles of firstly, no dissent among 
the ranks when voting as a bloc; and secondly, loyalty to the 
monarch and the constitutional declaration granting their 
entitlement as the Kingdom of Tonga’s title and estate holders.  
With clear-cut principles and policies defining the landed 
gentry’s identity, constitutional privilege, and position of 
authority in the national hierarchy as representatives of the 
crown and ruling class, it was evident the nobles knew who 
they were, how they were related, and what they were about in 
parliament.   
How would a political party of commoners outflank Tongan 
tradition by reinventing history from below to possess superior 
authority and power to the national hierarchy?  By Tongan 
social norms, was it considered necessary to raze to the 
ground a hierarchy of titled men, who by the monarch’s 
tutelage, were symbolic of Tonga’s unique sovereignty? 
Halapua ought to have edited his indictment that in Tonga 
“we don’t have a party system” to reflect historical correctness 
(Radio New Zealand, 2014a).  At the 2010 general election, 
38,447 voters took to the seventeen constituency polls to elect 
the people’s representatives to parliament (Matangi Tonga, 
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2010).  An overwhelming majority of 25,873 voters gave their 
single vote in the first past the post system to independent 
candidates, not political party candidates (Matangi Tonga, 
2010).  A statistical comparison revealed the truth about voter 
behaviour.  Halapua was thoughtlessly mistaken.  Political 
parties were included in the electoral system, but Tongans 
voted for independent candidates in their constituencies more 
than party candidates.   
Tongans were legendary at voting for kainga, their blood 
relatives, kinfolk, affine, and even close family friends and 
community fellows.  Policies their kainga promoted rated 
second to the fact that relationship connections figured highly 
in determining how a vote was cast.  No matter how many 
foreign meddlers disguised as benevolent aid donors and their 
army of consultants swore that public education would 
strengthen democracy, Tongans continued to vote for their 
own people, their kainga, in a system meant to lure them into 
voting for policies.  Did Western political thought provide a 
reasonable, workable model for reorganising Tongan voting 
patterns? (Osborne, 2014).  I seriously doubt that. 
Fleetingly, ‘Akilisi Pohiva attuned his Democratic Party 
sensor to the region, a surprising shift in subject matter from 
disputing points of political trivia against Sitiveni Halapua, 
‘Isileli Pulu, Sione Taione, and other men he erased as his 
party’s candidates for parliament.  I say fleetingly because 
Pohiva’s concentration span on what was happening regionally 
in other Pacific Island states materialised as a one-off moment 
(Bola-Bari, 2014a, 2014b; Anneberg and Kata, 2014; Graue, 
2014; Haywood-Jones, 2009).  Sceptically, his favourable 
opinion of Fiji’s Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama read like a 
publicity stunt to incite and excite media attention in an 
election year. 
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I admire him [Fiji Prime Minister Bainimarama] for 
that.  He has been able to make things happen and 
take development to the people, which had not 
happened for years.  He had the will to make things 
happen, to make reality of things that were planned 
over the years.  Every government needs to have the 
political will to implement positive changes.  Even 
though there have been recommendations made by the 
International Monetary Fund and other organisations; 
this is a big problem, not only here in Tonga, but in 
many small developing countries in the region.  There is 
a lack of will to implement things, to connect things and 
make them happen.  It is something that we, as a 
party, are looking at because we also want to form the 
next government.  We must have the political will to 
make changes.  This government does not have that.  I 
know some of my own party members do not have that.  
It’s an issue that we will continue to face but we must 
start doing things right.  We must have the checks and 
balance system; we must have transparency.  This is 
the ultimate aim.  I like that Prime Minister 
Bainimarama has done in Fiji in making things happen.  
And my government will make the necessary changes, 
as recommended by so many international teams that 
have done country analysis on Tonga. (Pohiva cited in 
Tonga Daily News, 2014b). 
 
“We must have the political will,” avowed ‘Akilisi Pohiva to 
Fijian reporter Iliesa Tora of Tonga Daily News at a Tongan 
government luncheon in Nuku’alofa on June 25th 2014 (Tonga 
Daily News, 2014b).  The political will to “make [what] 
necessary changes, as recommended by so many international 
teams that have done country analysis on Tonga,” Pohiva was 
not coming out with concisely (Tonga Daily News, 2014b).   
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His political ace was the change card, which three months 
off from the general election he played close to his chest.  
However, he did drop a few hints as to what he was plotting 
and that his political scheme if elected to government had not 
shifted from the 2010 election campaign four-years prior 
(Moala, 2014b).  Pohiva was wedded to thinking that Tonga’s 
democracy was incomplete, and to finish the job he would get 
rid of the nine nobles’ seats if he could get away with it.  If he 
could not, then scaling down the number of nobles in the 
House was plan B. 
Whatever Pohiva meant by “political will,” one signal 
became clear (Tonga Daily News, 2014b).  It was now his 
catchphrase which he bandied around loosely to argue that 
the Tu’ivakano government lacked the backbone and 
determination to “take development to the people,” unlike Fiji’s 
Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama whom Pohiva held in high 
regard (Tonga Daily News, 2014b).  The Democratic Party 
leader was busy inventing social memory to engineer a media 
scoop that framed Fiji as the development success story 
measured against a failed Tongan economy.  The contrariness 
of Tonga’s long standing pro-democracy politician venerating 
Bainimarama, Fiji’s military coup leader non-elected to his 
country’s premiership, underlined the double-standards and 
rich irony that Tongan electioneering had fast become 
doubted, disbelieved, and distrusted for. 
The Democratic Party divorce between the party leader and 
subordinate others provided a public spectacle stalked by 
media and published in news headlines.  In addition to this, it 
also created a Tongan example of Parkinson’s theory on 
triviality, or the bike shed effect as it has been called 
(Northcote Parkinson, 1957).  To give a summation, Parkinson 
made a compelling case that bureaucracies and organisations 
spend excessive amounts of time discussing petty concerns of 
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no great significance and advantage to the group they work for 
or represent as an affiliate. 
At one committee meeting, Parkinson observed members 
spent a few minutes discussing their company’s investment in 
a nuclear reactor, the highest priority on the agenda (Shapley 
and Shubik, 1954).  The lowest priority, building a bike shed 
for company staff, stimulated a lengthy debate and some 
quarrelling over what colour to paint the bike shed.  The bike 
shed effect occurs when people cannot grasp the entirety, 
complexity, and detail of an important topic (Gough, 2011).  
They therefore turn their attention to trivialities where 
everyone, as opposed to a knowledgeable few, can contribute 
expert discussion on “all kinds of uselessness” (McCourt, 
1996).  Thus, last season’s Democratic Party falling apart at 
the seams and getting a makeover by introducing new model 
candidates for the election catwalk, definitely stirred up 
something of the bike shed effect. 
In the 21st century, if international relations was truly 
reconfiguring the Pacific Islands region and Tonga under its 
Orwellian omnipotent force, then what was foreign policy? 
(Orwell, 1949).  Put bluntly, under the Tu’ivakano regime 
Tonga had accommodated the Ma’afu mindset to manoeuvring 
on the foreign affairs front.  The Minister for Lands Lord 
Ma’afu, a former military officer and aide-de-camp to King 
Taufa’ahau Tupou IV, practiced real politik, meaning tactics of 
power politics to strategise Tonga’s vantage point 
(Mearsheimer, 2014; Mindle, 1985; Yurdesev, 2006).   
Coordinated in Ma’afu’s political thinking were three 
principles.  To start with, foreign policy had to benefit Tongan 
national interests.  Subsequent to this, national interests was 
the equivalent concept and practice for national security.  
Lastly, every country, no matter how big or small, had the 
right to have their national interests recognised regionally 
Minerals and Cucumbers in the Sea 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
395 
among Pacific Island states, and internationally at the world 
parliament of the United Nations. 
On noting that, what did Tongan foreign policy come down 
to by Ma’afu’s style of practice?  Why was it vital for 
prospective parliamentarians looking to form the next 
government to study how Tonga’s international relations 




Manoeuvring at the macro-level 
 
A critique is not a matter of saying that things are 
not right as they are.  It is a matter of pointing out on 
what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, 
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the 
practices that we accept rest. 
Michel Foucault 
 
Michel Foucault’s logic made sense in a Western state and 
society such as modern day France, his national country: “A 
critique does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the 
way they are.  It consists in seeing on just what type of 
assumptions, of familiar notions, of established and 
unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are 
based.  …To do criticism [therefore] is to make harder those 
acts which are now too easy” (Foucault, 1988). 
But “to do criticism” in Tonga as a Native Tongan whether 
nobleman or commoner had a catch to it, as any Tongan born 
and raised in the homeland state could explain (Foucault, 
1988).  In this small island developing state where the 
“accepted practice” was for the state to reproduce social 
hierarchy, the pecking order of men who assumed authority 
was seldom called out and publicly named “unexamined” 
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convention (Foucault, 1988).  Expressly a critique of the 
monarch’s executive powers as the head of state and military 
commander in chief did not exist in public criticism.  What did 
occur was a surrogate practice of making “harder those acts 
which are now too easy” (Foucault, 1988).   
Put plainly on “the micro-level of interpersonal 
relationships” men of customary authority, the nobility in 
particular, jostled and elbowed each other in parliamentary 
debate.  The objective was for one noble to raise their public 
profile at the expense of another as the more clued-up 
gentleman of the upper class who knew about modern politics 
and society (De Souza, 2014).  As a method of exerting 
influence over noble peers and commoners in the House, the 
real purpose was to amass popularity by appealing to 
parliamentarians and the general public as a better nobles’ 
representative; one who participated in the world outside of an 
insular class bubble, and seemed adaptable to working beyond 
the constraints of a nobleman’s smugness and comfort zone. 
Of course this was a form of public campaigning for the 
nobility disguised as a critique of the nobles’ pecking order in 
the legislative assembly; a self-evaluation of “who’s who in the 
zoo” in respect of who needs to be bumped off, nudged out, 
and shafted along to make room for new zoo characters.1  
Considering the commoner public registered on the general 
roll did not vote in the nobles’ election, surveying the nobility 
go hammer and tongs in the House was the predominant way 
                                                 
1  Who’s who in the zoo? 
This is the Master of Philosophy thesis title by Richard 
Pamatatau, journalism lecturer in the School of Communications 
at Auckland University of Technology.  Pamatatau’s thesis 
investigates the journalism methods by which New Zealand’s elite 
are framed, reported, and disseminated in the social and weekend 
pages of prominent newspapers such as The New Zealand Herald.  
Pamatatau is of Mauke, Cook Islands descent, and was the former 
Pacific correspondent for Radio New Zealand who reported from 
Tonga on the 2010 general election. 
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they could judge who’s in and who’s out by their assessment 
as outsiders and observers; not that the opinions of the 
commoner class swayed how the upper class voted during 
their in-house election.  Only fools and horses would be 
gullible enough to believe Tongan commoners had any effect 
over which nobles were chosen from among their own class 
group for parliamentary duty. 
Ruth De Souza’s opinion that politics in general across the 
globe had to move away from “the micro-level” towards a 
“macro-level of [understanding and influencing] international 
relations” rang true in Tonga’s regressive and inward looking 
case.  “I call for our politics to extend beyond the micro-level of 
interpersonal relationships to consider the meso-level of 
institutions and nations and the macro-level of international 
relations.  We need it now more than we’ve ever needed it,” 
wrote De Souza (De Souza, 2014).  But who in Tonga’s 
legislative assembly was adjusting the political lens outward to 
look at the international landscape of “institutions, nations 
and relations,” and who by contrast was heading in the 
opposite direction, backwards to the narrow-minded periphery 
of politicking the personal and by doing so, personalising 
politics? (De Souza, 2014).  
The first week for Tonga’s 2014 legislative assembly 
convened for four days from Monday July 21st to Thursday 
July 24th.  Wednesday afforded an opportunity to thrash out 
amendments to the general regulations of the exclusive 
economic zone of Tonga (Kingdom of Tonga, 2007). Tonga’s 
Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 2007 was up 
for debate with Lord Ma’afu, the Minister for Lands and 
Natural Resources heading the legislative assembly 
deliberations by taking an offensive position.  Ma’afu had 
brought the amended act into the House.  His words and 
doggedness showed he was fixated on members of parliament 
Minerals and Cucumbers in the Sea 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
398 
correctly understanding the legal and regulatory framework, 
and answering their queries in a short, sharp tone and tenor. 
Running strictly to army time, Ma’afu wanted legislature 
endorsement from the majority.  This was his single-minded 
mission.  A quarter of a decade as an officer in His Majesty’s 
Armed Services, the lands minister manoeuvred a military 
tactic by executing a calculated plan with precision.  He grew 
impatient with politicians spouting off two seneti [cents] worth 
of surmising, and did not have all day to dilly-dally around 
with inaccurate rambling and long windedness. 
At this Wednesday July 23rd session where Lord Ma’afu’s 
adjustments to general regulations were formally scheduled, 
Lord Nuku, the noble’s representative for ‘Eua took the lead on 
putting in his two seneti [cents] and pushing for a dollar 
change.  In other words, Nuku baited Ma’afu as the Minister 
for Lands and Natural Resources and a fellow nobles’ 
representative to get a bite.  That, he definitely got from a 
feisty, forthright Ma’afu who appeared in no mood for beating 
around the bush on what he saw to be straightforward, logical 
improvements. 
The following verbatim excerpts in the Tongan language 
taken from the Tonga Hansard report for the House session on 
Wednesday July 23 2014 have a brief English synopsis (Tonga 
Hansard, 2014b).  The summation condenses the main point 
of discussion which Nuku and Ma’afu respectively convey in 
their dialogical exchange, and is by no means a word-for-word 
translation.   
In the first section, the Speaker of the House Lord 
Fakafanua made a lame attempt to settle the score by sitting 
on the fence and stating the obvious; that is, the nobles Nuku 
and Ma’afu were disputing amendments to the regulations 
because they had interpreted the matter differently.  If the 
truth be told, Fakafanua, a young, naïve, and politically 
inexperienced noble would not want to get in the middle of a 
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scrap between two nobles of seniority and status, and was 
better off keeping his nose out of it, which he probably sensed 
given his pintsized intervention as the speaker.  Notably, he 
did get his facts botched.  It was not the actual nitty-gritty of 
the intended changes that was being contested here. 
Nuku’s argument digressed from evaluating whether the 
alterations were defensible and procedural.  He put forward 
that changing one clause on the general regulations of Tonga’s 
exclusive economic zone meant taking into consideration that 
the other clauses and parts of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act 2007 would also need to be corrected to 
align with the modifications.  Ma’afu abruptly begged to differ, 
stating that this was certainly not the case for amending 
clause 10 under Part II of the exclusive economic zone of 
Tonga. 
 
Nuku:   ‘Eiki Sea, ko e tokanga pe ‘a e motu’ a 
ni ia koe’ uhi he founga ko ‘eni ke mea’ i pe Sea ko ‘ene liliu pe 
ha kupu kuo uesia pea mo e to e kupu.  Pea kapau leva te tau 
liliu he ‘oku pehe pe anga koe fa’u ‘o e lao hange ko e ngaahi 
tu’utu’uni ko ‘eni ‘oku tau ‘au ki ai Sea, ko ‘etau hang ape ‘o 
liliu ha fo’i fotunga ha fo’i kupu ‘e taha ‘oku fekau ‘aki pe ‘u 
kupu katoa mei he ‘uluaki ‘o a’u ki he fakamuimui.  Pea kapau 
te tau hanga ‘o liliu ko e me’a ia ko e ‘oku fai ki ai ‘a e hoha’a 
Sea, kapau leva ‘oku fekau’aki ‘a e u kupu pea … ‘oku 
faka’uhinga pehe ‘a e ‘uhinga ko e hono hoko atu ko e ‘i he 
Komiti Kokato, koe ‘uhi ko ‘ene fetongi pe ha kupu ‘oku ‘I ai ‘a e 
ki’i liliu ia ‘i he natula ko e ‘o e lao pea ‘oku feinga leva ke 
fakatatau ki he me’a ko e ‘oku fai ki ai ko e ‘a e ‘uhinga na’e 
fokotu’u mai ai Sea. (Tonga Hansard, 2014b, p. 10). 
If we are going to change any regulations, or any part 
of the law, it is going to affect all other parts in relation 
to that change.  
Minerals and Cucumbers in the Sea 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
400 
Ma’afu: Sea, ko eku fakatonutonu pe ki he Hou’eiki 
Nopele Sea ko e fo’i Lao Fakaangangaanga ia ko ‘eni ‘oku 
vahevahe ia ki he konga ‘e 10, pea kapau ‘e to’o ‘a e ki’i fo’i 
konga ia ‘e 1 hono alea ‘i pea liliu ia kei lele lelei pe ki’i fo’i lao 
ia Sea ‘oku ‘ikai ke ‘i ai ha uesia ia ai Sea, malo Sea. (Tonga 
Hansard, 2014b, p. 10). 
No, the new regulations have come in only to change 
Part 10.  If you only change one part of it, you do not 
need to go back and change the whole lot. 
Nuku:  ‘Eiki Sea, ‘oku ou … malo ‘aupito ‘a e 
‘omai ko ‘eni ‘o e me’a ‘oku ‘uhinga fakalukufua atu au ‘eni ia 
ki he ngaue Fale Alea ‘oku ‘ikai ke u nofo taha pe au ‘i he lao ko 
‘eni.  Ko e ‘uhinga pe ‘a ‘aku ia koe ‘uhi ko e founga ngaue ko 
‘eni ko e ‘oku tau ngaue’ aki ‘i he Tohi Tu’utu’uni Sea, kapau ko 
e me’a ia ‘a e ‘Eiki Minisita ia ki he lao kehekehe pe ia, pea ko e 
Feitu’una pe te ke hanga ‘o aofangatuku ka ‘oku fai ‘a e hoha’a 
atu ia koe’ uhi ko e natula fakalukufua ko e ngaue Fale Alea 
Sea, malo ‘aupito. (Tonga Hansard, 2014b, p. 10). 
That is how the Minister interprets it, and that is why 
parliament is here; to make sure the Minister comes back 
so we can debate the issue. 
Fakafanua: Fakamalo atu Hou’eiki.  Hou’eiki ‘oku fie 
fakamanatu atu heni na’e ‘ikai ke u fa’u ‘e au ‘a e Tu’utu’uni ko 
‘eni, ko e me’a pe ‘eni kuo pau ke … ko e Tu’tutu’uni pe ‘eni kuo 
pau ke tau muimui ki ai, pe ‘i he ‘eku faka’uhinga ‘oku ‘ata pe 
ia, ‘oku ha mahino pe ai ‘a e faikehekehe ‘i he kupu mo e Lao 
Fakaangaanga Kaikehe, hange pe ko e me’a na’aku ‘uhinga atu 
ki ai kimu’a ‘e malava p eke mou malanga fakalukufua pea 
kapau ‘e fakafoki mai pe ki he tefito’i kupu ‘eni na’e ‘uhinga ai 
hono tukuhifo ki he Komiti Kakato.  Kau ai ‘a e ngaahi kupu 
kehe ‘e uesia ‘i hano liliu ‘a e kupu koi a, kapau ‘oku mahino ia 
ki he Fakafofonga ‘o e Hou’eiki Nopele. (Tonga Hansard, 2014b, 
p. 10). 
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That is how people look at regulations and 
misinterpret it, so the regulations are going back to the 
full committee.  The two nobles are disputing the 
regulations.  They have a different interpretation of it. 
 
Two reasons have prompted me to cite this passage from 
the Tonga Hansard transcript detailing a debate in the House 
between Lord Nuku, the noble’s representative for ‘Eua and 
Lord Ma’afu, the number two noble’s representative for 
Tongatapu and Minister for Lands and Natural Resources.  
First and foremost, there was never any substantive argument 
over the changes to general regulations under clause 10, Part 
II of the exclusive economic zone of Tonga in the Territorial Sea 
and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 2007.  In fact the revisions 
were not clearly spelled out in the House session, and nor 
were their specificity and the necessity for making changes 
weighed up by parliamentarians in a detailed examination.  If 
anything, the opposition bench sat quietly compliant with 
Sione Taione, the people’s representative for Tongatapu 8 and 
a Democratic Party member going into bat for Lord Ma’afu’s 
side by defending the minister’s amendments. 
In one way, it could be said that the content of clause 1o 
admonished any figurative punch ups in parliament by way of 
politicians’ word battles.  Hence, “10 General Regulations” on 
Tonga’s exclusive economic zone of 200 miles began by 
affirming: “The King may from time to time, by Order-in-
Council, make regulations for all or any of the following 
purposes.”  Stop tape, rewind the very thought of criticising 
the monarch’s executive powers in Privy Council propped up 
by Law Lords, and what was it that Guy Powles, the 
constitution law researcher uttered to Radio Australia?  “The 
dramatic change has occurred [in Tonga’s system of power].  
The door has been opened” for Western liberal democracy, or 
something or other (Garrett, 2014b). 
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Life in the legislature revealed a twofold political reality 
was busy at work.  The opposition could see at a glance the 
Minister for Lands and Natural Resources was meticulously 
putting law changes in order to line up his ducks; meaning 
Ma’afu was getting his ministry’s affairs organised to fully 
house deep sea mineral exploration and exploitation before the 
conclusion of the Tu’ivakano government’s four-year term in 
December of 2014.  He planned to permanently embed seabed 
minerals into the ministry’s function and purpose.  By doing 
so, the succeeding government could not easily back out on 
the current regime decision to commit the Tongan state to 
deep sea mining. 
Earlier in the year, Lord Ma’afu with the backing of Prime 
Minister Tu’ivakano and cabinet deliberately divorced the 
Ministry of Environment and Climate Change.  He now 
operated as a stand-alone Ministry of Lands and Natural 
Resources.  A context-specific logic propelled the separation.  
First of all, an official government line was put to the public.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Prime Minister Lord 
Tu’ivakano’s portfolio, had appropriated environment and 
climate change to group together six departments under one 
super ministry of environment, energy, natural disaster, 
climate change, the meteorological office, and information 
(Tonga Daily News, 2014b).  Orchestrated by a rationale that 
under Foreign Affairs and Trade the divisions would gain 
greater access to international aid donations also existed the 
allusion “of generating income through this new department to 
fund the new foreshores for Ha’apai,” divulged the Deputy 
Prime Minister Samiu Vaipulu (Tonga Daily News, 2014b). 
Underpinning the official spiel was Lord Ma’afu’s self-
styled real politik.  By no uncertain terms did he baulk at 
severing environment and climate change from lands and 
natural resources.  Why not?  Considering the late King 
George Tupou V appointed Ma’afu the Minister for 
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Environment and Climate Change in 2009, one year after he 
first entered parliament, conferring on him the responsibility 
to capacity build a new ministry with little funding, why did he 
not shriek over the split up?  Originally environment and 
climate change was Ma’afu’s baby that he nurtured from 
infancy; one which had given him a foot on the international 
stage as a South Pacific climate campaigner at the 15th 
session of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in Copenhagen 2009 (Brown Pulu, 2013a, 
2013b). 
The succinct answer was real not imagined power politics 
had adjusted his focus.  Lord Ma’afu was exclusively and 
explicitly after deep sea minerals.  Freeing up an individual 
Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources detached from an 
environmental protection arm alleviated the long-running 
tension which had escalated between the lands’ geologists 
coveting deep sea mineral extraction, opposed to the climate 
change activists desiring strict conservation of natural 
resources (Brown Pulu, 2014).  Now, who possessed state 
authority over natural resources in the restructuring exercise?  
The words of the late French philosopher Jacques Derrida 
rang out: “In short, you will never know” (Derrida, 1999).  But 
Ma’afu did know that the legislative and regulatory framework 
remained the same, granting his portfolio of lands and natural 
resources the ministerial power to manage and administer 
state natural resources, including ocean borders and 
territories, which housed the new baby he was raising named 
seabed minerals. 
Subsequent to this, from a prospective position the 
Democratic Party were not singly acquiescent to Ma’afu’s 
revisions on general regulations of Tonga’s exclusive economic 
zone for the sake of being agreeable and cooperative fellow 
legislators.  In this sense, political reality was far more 
pragmatic than idealistic.  The Ministry of Lands and Natural 
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Resource’s pursuit of seabed minerals on the country’s behalf 
was a development policy which ‘Akilisi Pohiva if elected prime 
minister in 2014 and an incoming Democratic Party 
government would undoubtedly continue, without 
reconsidering its high-prioritisation and merit as a national 
strategy for economic growth. 
Second, Ruth De Souza’s “call for our politics to extend 
beyond the micro-level of interpersonal relationships to 
consider the meso-level of institutions and nations and the 
macro-level of international relations,” had a case in point with 
the Nuku and Ma’afu spat (De Souza, 2014).  Aside from the 
parliamentary tit-for-tat staging two nobles disagreeing; two 
nobles who were meant to be playing cricket for the same 
traditional team that customarily won the national match 
against the commoner opposition, a binary of “micro-level 
interpersonal relationships” and “macro-level international 
relations” transpired between them (De Souza, 2014).  Their 
politics were streets apart, dispelling the myth that because 
the nobility voted solidly as a bloc of nine parliamentary seats 
on legislative matters they naturally shared uniform and 
unchanging values and visions.  This simplistic deduction was 
untrue. 
Looking at “the micro-level of interpersonal relationships,” 
Lord Nuku was the noble transmitter of such a stand (De 
Souza, 2014).  His interchange with the Minister for Lands and 
Survey turned Lord Ma’afu into the opponent because in all 
honesty, Nuku was upping his own credibility during a 
publicly broadcasted parliamentary debate as the more 
knowledgeable noble of law and regulation design.  But 
without a concrete examination of the exact clauses and parts 
of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 2007 
Nuku believed should be tweaked to bring into line the 
revisions Ma’afu had submitted to the House, there was no 
disputation of the law.  Conversely, bickering emerged over 
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whose interpretation on how to go about revamping the law 
was correct, Nuku or Ma’afu. 
To contextualise “the micro-level of interpersonal 
relationships” fuelling the Nuku versus Ma’afu squabble, here 
were two nobles’ representatives for the four seats assigned to 
the main island where over sixty percent of the country’s 
population of 104,941 resided (De Souza, 2014).  At the 2010 
election, Ma’afu had been voted into parliament by his class 
peers as the number two noble for Tongatapu.  Nuku, by 
comparison, got last place in the Tongatapu electorate at 
number four, and was therefore assigned the seat for ‘Eua 
Island. 
To tease out the “micro-level” even further, Nuku won a 
by-election for the ‘Eua seat on August 2nd 2012 because Lord 
Lasike, the original noble who held the seat was dismissed 
from his job as Speaker of the House (De Souza, 2014).  With 
Lasike’s sacking, he also lost his nobles’ representative seat in 
parliament.  Ma’afu at number two outflanked Nuku at four in 
terms of winning the popular vote, but the incisive query was 
would the ranking order change at the nobles’ in-house 
election set for November 27th 2014? 
It was no secret that both Nuku and Ma’afu were strong 
contenders for re-election.  The grand prize, however, was 
entering the House as the number one noble’s representative 
for Tongatapu having secured the majority of votes.  Number 
one led the nobility and had considerable sway over how the 
bloc would vote.  Nuku was not shy to push his own barrow, 
staking out territory as the nobility’s strongest parliamentary 
debater.  Whether the arguments he mooted for contention 
were on point or not was peripheral to the fact that he had 
grown a public reputation as the most vocal noble who gave 
his opinion on every matter raised in parliament.  Nuku’s 
verboseness versus Ma’afu’s reserved manner of generally 
speaking only to his ministry’s core business in short, terse 
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bursts put their communication techniques at odds, while 
exhibiting the range and reach of leadership styles. 
Contrastingly “the meso-level of institutions and nations 
and the macro-level of international relations” was earmarked 
for Lord Ma’afu (De Souza, 2014).  Out of necessity he 
disregarded “the micro-level of interpersonal relationships” in 
parliament between the nobility and likewise, across class 
groups of commoners and nobles (De Souza, 2014).  The 
machinery of government had become increasingly 
bureaucratised during the Tu’ivakano regime with an 
emphasis on recruiting technocrats, meaning technical experts 
in senior management and administration positions, to run 
the state.  Early on in the government’s 2010 to 2014 term, 
Ma’afu found his forte to aggressively chase seabed minerals 
with every intention of making it a high-priority development 
industry for the state.   
There were obvious hold-ups.  Nationally, the Tongan state 
did not have a distinct law on seabed minerals and a 
regulatory framework to protect the state from liability for 
environmental loss and damage.  Regionally, Pacific Island 
states had shifted towards climate adaptation, disaster 
preparedness, and renewable energy as collective urgencies 
thus, outing seabed mineral exploration and exploitation as a 
development goal that an individual state decided to go after 
not inter-government organisations.  Internationally, Tonga’s 
appointment to the International Seabed Authority council in 
July of 2014 as one of the “eighteen members elected 
according to the principle of ensuring an equitable 
geographical distribution of seats” was fundamental to 
progressing seabed mining for the country (ISA, 2014a). 
The relationship web of infiltrating and connecting 
“institutions, nations, and international relations” in respect of 
seabed minerals had mechanised the Minister for Lands and 
Natural Resources into a bureaucratised political actor 
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focused on processes and outcomes (De Souza, 2014).  
Operating in a different work mode to his fellow nobles’ 
representative to parliament Lord Nuku, where in the scope of 
“meso-level and macro-level” politics would Lord Ma’afu have 
the time of day to concentrate on “the micro-level of 
interpersonal relationships” between politicians promoting 
themselves for re-election? (De Souza, 2014). 
 
Borderlines on the ocean 
“How can we define the line because our boundaries are so 
close, as in the case of Fiji?” (Tonga Hansard, 2014, p. 38).  
Lord Ma’afu put the question to the House.  His quiz was 
proposed as a thought provoker not a thought provider.  Here 
was a probe that set out to occupy another’s pondering around 
delimiting Tonga’s ocean borders, rather than provide 
information on how it is practically done.  Tagged on the end 
of a pithy response to Lord Nuku’s soliloquy, it was meant as a 
full stop, curbing any further digression away from discussing 
changes to general regulations in the Territorial Sea and 
Exclusive Economic Zone Act 2007. 
The short answer was no.  Ma’afu was gesturing to a tale 
of two countries navigating sea currents of twists and turns.  
At this point in time, there was no state method for delimiting 
ocean borders between Tonga and six neighbouring countries 
flanking its exclusive economic zone.  Particularly, sorting out 
sea boundaries with Fiji had a history of “fertile tension” 
(Spivak, 1990, p. 99).  In 2005, Fiji contested Tonga’s national 
sovereignty over two underwater reefs, and had counter 
claimed to the International Seabed Authority of which it was 
currently a council member that the Minerva Reefs belonged to 
them not Tonga (Brown Pulu, 2014; Radio New Zealand, 2005; 
Coutts, 2011). 
This was compounded by the fact that ocean borders 
collided.  Tonga’s 200 mile exclusive economic zone ran up 
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against Fiji’s boundary.  To extend the country’s ocean area 
beyond that by requesting an additional continental shelf 
territory of up to 500 kilometres outside of the exclusive 
economic zone was pushing the limits (Brown Pulu, 2014).  To 
be concise, Tonga and Fiji had put continental shelf 
submissions into the United Nations Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for assessment.  The 
applications overlapped, a polite way of saying Tonga and Fiji’s 
respective continental shelf assertions ploughed into each 
other.  In the end, they wanted to seize the same extended sea 
territory in the Lau Basin. 
The pieces of the narrative fitted together.  It became 
comprehensible why Ma’afu had been fixated on Tonga’s July 
2014 election to the International Seabed Authority council to 
match Fiji’s re-election.  A political leverage strategy to get on 
par with Fiji at the world council for seabed governance, 
Tonga’s representation fired a double-edged plan.  The 
Minister for Lands and Natural Resources was dead serious 
about growing Tonga’s effectiveness as a small island 
developing state sponsor of seabed mining companies in 
international waters outside of the country’s 200 mile 
exclusive economic zone.  Having every opportunity at 
international, regional, and country-to-country dialogues to 
improve relations with the Fijian government, also a state 
sponsor competitor wanting profitable seabed mining 
contracts, was vital to keeping the peace with the eastern 
border neighbour and clearing up ocean boundary disputes. 
Ma’afu’s response to Nuku in the legislative assembly on 
Wednesday 23 July 2014 about the difficulty of drawing 
borderlines between small island developing states, which 
were really “large ocean states,” rolled over the 
parliamentarians’ heads like an incoming tide (Mark Brown 
cited in Perrottet, 2011).  But he put the hard question out 
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there: “How can we define the line?” (Tonga Hansard, 2014, p. 
38).   
In many ways, his frame of inquiry did more to expose a 
dearth of understanding inside the legislature as to how and 
why international authority controls country-to-country 
relations between Pacific Island states all grappling with the 
same complex situation.  In the 21st century, the Pacific 
Ocean was legislated as if it were landed territory under an 
international governance regime specified by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1983. 
How in the “meso-level and macro-level” of “institutions, 
nations, and international relations” could Tonga best 
manoever its quest for seabed minerals as a high-priority 
development goal by adapting the Law of the Sea 1983 to 
national legislation?  Ma’afu’s logic was clear-cut.  For the 
Tongan state to be assured of business sustainability as a 
seabed minerals sponsor necessitated that its sea boundaries 
were safe and secure by delimitation according to national and 
international law. 
   
Nuku:  … ‘uhinga foki hange ko e me’a ko eni 
kapau ‘oku kei laumalie pe ‘a e fo’i mape ko ia ‘a Tupou 1.  Ka 
‘oku mahino kiate au ‘i he’ ene tu’u ko ia heni ko ‘etau ngaue 
‘aki eni e vahevahe he konivesio ‘a e UN [United Nations].  Ka 
ko ‘eku tokanga pe ki ai pe ‘oku tau kamata mei fe hotau 
ngatangata’ anga.  Pe ‘oku tau kamata ‘i he fo’i mape ko ia he 
1887 ‘a ia ‘oku kamata foki ia ‘i tahi, ko hotau boundary ia ‘oku 
tau ngata ai.  Ka ko e konivesio foki ko eni mahalo ‘oku tatau 
fakalukufua ia ki he, mei hotau matafanga ‘o lele ai e u maile 
ko ia ‘alu atu ‘o 200 pe ‘oku tolungofulu tupu.  Ka ko ‘eku fie 
lave’ i pe ‘e au ia pe ko fe koa e me’a ‘oku tau kamata totonu 
mei ai.  Malo ‘Eiki Minisita. (Tonga Hansard, 2014b, p. 38). 
In the time of King Tupou I, they first decided Tonga’s 
ocean boundaries in 1887.  The United Nations 
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Convention [of the Law of the Sea] decides boundaries.  
The United Nations Convention says its 200 miles. 
Ma’afu: Sea, ko e fehu ‘i mahu’inga ia ‘oku me’a mai ki 
ai e Nopele he ko e tu’unga ia ‘oku tau ‘i ai he taimi ni.  Tau 
recognize ‘etautolu e fo’i puha na’e declare ko ia ‘e Tupou 1 pea 
‘oku tau to e fakamo’oni ki he konivesio ko e he Law of the Sea 
‘a e ko e ‘oku ‘ai e 200.  Pea ‘oku te’eki ai ke to e fu’u, ‘osi 
kamata pe ka ‘oku te’eki ai ke lava faka’osi ‘etau talanoa mo 
hotau ‘u kaunga api.  Tau pehe hange ko Fisi [Fiji] ‘a eni ko e 
‘oku hoko kia tautolu.  Te tau ta fefe fo’i laini [line] ‘oku tau fu’u 
vaofi.  Ka ko e ‘uhinga, ko e fehu’i ko e ‘a e Nopele, ‘oku 
lolotonga ngaue ki ai e Pule’anga he taimi ni ke sio ange ko fe ‘a 
ngatangata’ anga ko e ‘o Tonga ni.  He kapau ‘e tuku mai ia ki 
Tonga ni te tau kamata tautolo ‘uluaki ‘ai e puha ia pea tau toki 
lau mei ai e u malie ‘e 200 kitu’a ka he ‘ikai foki ke tali ia ‘e he 
kaunga’ api mo e me’a.  Ka ‘oku lolotonga fai e ngaue lahi ki ai 
‘a e Pule’anga he taimi ni Sea.  Malo Sea. (Tonga Hansard, 
2014b, p. 38). 
I agree with Tupou I and the Law of the Sea 
Convention defining a 200 mile boundary.  We have not 
finished deciding our ocean boundaries.  How can we 
define the line because our boundaries are so close, as in 
the case of Fiji?  The government is working on it now to 
decide the ocean boundaries. 
 
If the “government is working on it now to decide the ocean 
boundaries,” as Lord Ma’afu made publicly known in the 
legislature, then what exactly was the Tongan state doing?  
More concisely, what was the Minister for Lands and Natural 
Resources fixing to do seeing deep sea minerals fell under his 
ministerial dominion? (Tonga Hansard, 2014b, p. 38).  
“Working on it now” meant a division of labour across two 
fields, governance and politics (Tonga Hansard, 2014b, p. 38).  
When operating the two at the same time the trickier cog in 
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the machinery of government was politics, often dressed up as 
diplomacy. 
It was well known that Tonga’s diplomatic handling of the 
Minerva Reefs quarrel with Fiji produced dismal failure.  To be 
contritely blunt, Tonga had exercised no diplomacy, tact, and 
negotiation over the matter.  Instead, consecutive governments 
of Feleti Sevele and Lord Tu’ivakano used the same three-step 
method.  First, mobilising the Tongan navy to patrol and 
safeguard the reefs; second, submitting claims to the United 
Nations that Minerva fell under Tonga’s sovereign jurisdiction; 
and third, brandishing around the 1972 Royal Proclamation of 
King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV declaring property ownership of the 
Minerva Reefs, which were renamed Teleki Tokelau and Teleki 
Tonga.   
Real politik talks with a strategic approach on sorting out 
how two bickering small island developing states could strike a 
win-win compromise never saw the light of day.  From Fiji’s 
2005 opposition, to Tonga’s territorial sovereignty laid down on 
the Minerva Reefs, right up to the present-day, diplomacy was 
waiting to be put to work.  In the meantime, three public 
arguments gave reasons as to why the Tonga and Fiji dispute 
had erupted with no solution in sight. 
The first was an international relations contention traced 
to the realism school of thought.  Fiji’s militarisation under the 
Bainimarama regime was arguably an act of strengthening 
national security.  Rod Alley, a Pakeha New Zealander and 
strategic studies research fellow at Victoria University of 
Wellington saw the clash was therefore motivated by Fijian 
aggression. 
    
Fiji was using this dispute to flex their muscles and 
to show their neighbours that Fiji can stand in its own 
corner and declare its interests. (Rod Alley cited in One 
News, 2011). 
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Second came the economic growth line of reasoning.  Here, 
it was speculated that seabed minerals and “fishing rights,” 
which signalled to tuna stocks, had triggered money-making 
competition for natural resources that could be traded for 
profit.  
 
It is suspected the conflict is based around valuable 
underwater mineral deposits and fishing rights.  Fiji 
and Tonga have now gone to the United Nations for 
help to avoid a potentially serious situation. (One News, 
2011). 
 
Lastly, and perhaps the more convincing argument, was 
authored by Hanns Buchholz in his 1987 book, Law of the Sea 
Zones in the Pacific Ocean.  Buchholz evidenced that Fiji stood 
to lose a substantive area of ocean territory if they conceded to 
Tonga’s sovereign jurisdiction over the Minerva Reefs.  But he 
also affirmed that “the Tongan claims have to be recognized 
today” because at the time of the 1972 Royal Proclamation of 
King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV, no objection was raised by any 
Pacific Island state (Buchholz, 1987, p. 85). 
 
In those days nobody opposed this [1972 Royal] 
proclamation [of King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV], and 
therefore the Tongan claims have to be recognized 
today.  Taking these islands as the basis for the 
application of equidistant lines with neighbouring 
states, Tonga will gain approximately 194,000 square 
kilometres of sea area, and Fiji will lose 64,000 square 
kilometres.  Additionally, the maritime borders of Tonga 
and New Zealand will touch. (Buchholz, 1987, p. 85). 
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Buchholz’s judgement was the one that Ma’afu was 
socialised by, and sensitive to.  Of course the Minister for 
Lands and Natural Resources wholeheartedly believed that 
“the Tongan claims have to be recognized today” under 
international law, that is, the Convention of the Law of the Sea 
1983, and by world governance organisations such as the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and 
the International Seabed Authority (ISA) (Buchholz, 1987, p. 
85).  Ma’afu’s cultural and political socialisation as a noble of 
the realm, a nobles’ representative to parliament, a cabinet 
minister, and a Tongan citizen had shaped and styled his 
moral reasoning that Tonga was the rightful sovereign state of 
which the Minerva Reefs were part of. 
However, Tonga’s Minister for Lands and Natural 
Resources was also dissuaded from aggressively charging into 
a volatile situation with Fiji.  His moral reasoning rooted in a 
context-specific socialisation experience were the brakes 
constraining him.  To explain, Ma’afu had Fijian connections 
to the Lau Islands along with many Tongan nationals whose 
familial ancestries were marked by histories of social 
exchange, trade, and reciprocity, forming an extended 
community between the two island groups and geographically 
adjacent neighbours, Tonga and Lau.   
Indeed, he sympathised with the Fijian government’s stand 
that Minerva Reefs belonged to “the people of Ono-i-Lau in 
Fiji’s Lau Group as the traditional fishing ground of their 
ancestors for centuries” (Radio New Zealand, 2005).  Tongan 
fishermen avowed the reefs were a “traditional fishing ground” 
that their “ancestors” had used “for centuries” too (Radio New 
Zealand, 2005). 
In the midst of watching Tonga and Fiji attacking and 
discrediting one another’s sovereign claim, he maintained his 
composure as a high-ranking Tongan noble.  He had not 
surrendered to Fiji and he was no ordinary nobleman, but 
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rather, he was the holder of the Ma’afu title which made him 
the head of Tonga’s oldest and senior confederation of chiefs, 
the Ha’a Havea Lahi.  His social duty and political obligation 
were therefore firmly placed with King and country.  In a 
nutshell, both his traditional and ministerial responsibility 
amounted to protecting and defending the Kingdom of Tonga’s 
integrity and territory under the head of state and commander 
in chief, King Tupou VI. 
Ma’afu exercised caution on striking a balance between 
engineering diplomatic talks with the Fijian government 
alongside putting his ministry’s house in order for ocean 
borders and seabed mining by amending general regulations 
under national law.  Added to this, were the pragmatics of 
resolving what Tonga had historically believed were national 
sea boundaries with the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1983; the presiding legal framework prescribing an entirely 
different method for calculating a country’s exclusive economic 
zone and extended continental shelf.  Hanns Buchholz 
explained Tonga’s unique situation. 
 
Additionally, one would have to interpret the 1887 
sea borders as straight baselines, which is not in 
accordance with the new Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.  Apart from that, the neighbouring states – Fiji, 
Wallis and Futuna, Western Samoa, American Samoa 
and Niue – would be affected and would definitely not 
agree. (Buchholz, 1987, p. 85). 
 
It was Lord Nuku who raised the August 24th 1887 
declaration of King George Tupou I on Tonga’s sea boundaries 
with Lord Ma’afu in the parliamentary session of July 23rd 
2014.  The ocean coordinates and contents were mapped out 
as “all, islands, rocks, reefs, foreshores and waters lying 
between the fifteenth and twenty-third and a half degrees of 
Minerals and Cucumbers in the Sea 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
415 
south latitude and between the one hundred and seventy-third 
and the one hundred and seventy-seventh degrees of west 
longitude from the Meridian of Greenwich” (Kingdom of Tonga, 
2014, p. 1). 
Nuku’s argument was the Convention of the Law of the 
Sea 1983 outflanked King George Tupou I’s 1887 declaration, 
rendering it null and void in terms of practical applicability to 
mapping out ocean borders between Tonga and neighbouring 
states.  Ma’afu’s riposte was he agreed with the two different 
sets of principles a century apart used to establish Tonga’s 
maritime territory, the monarch’s 1887 declaration as well as 
the Law of the Sea 1983. 
Similar to Lord Nuku’s stand, Hanns Buchholz stressed 
Tonga’s 1887 declaration was out of kilter with the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1983, which took precedence as the 
international ruling delimiting all countries’ ocean borders.  
Related to this disjuncture was the fact that under the 1887 
declaration, national sea boundaries cut into the exclusive 
economic zones of six Pacific Island states, including New 
Zealand, who “would definitely not agree” with Tonga’s 19th 
century cartography (Buchholz, 1987, p. 85). 
Contrariwise, Tonga’s Minister for Lands and Natural 
Resources voiced he found agreement with both, despite the 
present-day reality that international law invalidated royal 
declarations and proclamations that did not align with their 
judgement on how the world’s seas and oceans were to be 
fairly divided up among states for exclusive economic zones 
and outer limits of the continental shelf.  Which brings me to 
query that given Lord Ma’afu was seeking a political opening to 
engage Fiji in diplomatic talks on reconciling the Minerva 
Reefs quarrel and colliding ocean borders, how might he 
integrate Tonga’s 1887 royal declaration into national 
legislation, the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 
2007?  Could this be considered anything other than an origin 
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moment in Tonga’s modern history; one when the country’s 
first constitutional monarch issued a 19th century 
pronouncement on sea boundaries which today was not legally 
binding or endorsed under international law? (One News, 
2011).  
I stress this because the Kingdom of Tonga Submission to 
the Commission of the Continental Shelf through the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, April 2014 which was authorised 
by the Minister for Lands and Natural Resources began by 
noting: “The Kingdom of Tonga is proud to have the longest 
continuous legal claim of historic title to maritime domain in 
the World” (Kingdom of Tonga, 2014, p. 1).  This starting point 
to Tonga’s United Nations application for an extended 
continental shelf in the Lau-Colville Ridge which intersected 
with Fiji’s claim in the same ocean territory was in direct 
reference to “The Royal Proclamation issued by His Majesty 
George Tubou, King of Tonga, on 24 August 1887” (Kingdom of 
Tonga, 2014, p. 1).  To recapitulate, the lead-in highlighted 
that King George Tupou I as head of state laid down “national 
jurisdiction by the Kingdom of Tonga” defining what he 
believed to be Tonga’s “maritime domain in the World” 
(Kingdom of Tonga, 2014, p. 1). 
Ma’afu had taken a distinct approach to contextualising 
Tonga’s continental shelf claim to the Lau-Colville Ridge than 
his predecessor, fellow noble and former Minister for Lands 
under the Feleti Sevele government, Lord Tuita.  He was 
historicising and politicising sea boundaries by emphasising 
the Kingdom of Tonga’s unique point of maritime difference to 
Fiji and neighbouring Pacific Island states.  “The Kingdom of 
Tonga is proud to have the longest continuous legal claim of 
historic title to maritime domain in the World” (Kingdom of 
Tonga, 2014, p. 1).  That mattered momentously to the point it 
would remain at the forefront of the country’s history, culture, 
and identity as Tonga’s edge over competing claims.   
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Hence, the critical inquiry was twofold.  If Ma’afu was after 
international recognition from the United Nations Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that Tonga had 
“the longest continuous legal claim of historic title to maritime 
domain in the World,” then how might acknowledgement of 
historical fact be manoeuvred by the Minister for Lands and 
Natural Resources to his country’s negotiating advantage with 
Fiji? (Kingdom of Tonga, 2014, p. 1).  Subsequent to this, 
would international recognition grant Tonga political leverage 
to adapt principles from the 1887 Royal Declaration on 
“historical title to maritime domain” and the 1972 Royal 
Proclamation over the Minerva Reefs in national legislation 
such as the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 
2007, and quite possibly, the future instatement of a seabed 
minerals law? (Kingdom of Tonga, 2014, p. 1).   
Whatever the case, Lord Ma’afu was figuring out by 
intuition and intellect the contours and conflicts of ocean 
borders in relation to seabed mining.  In many respects, his 
foresight and vision had shown to be far beyond the latitude of 
fellow parliamentarians and previous ministers appointed the 
lands and natural resources portfolio.  Anticipating the prime 
minister and cabinet changeover after the November 27th 
2014 election, Ma’afu would be a hard act to follow and 




Minerals and cucumbers in the sea 
On Friday 25th July 2014, the Government of Tonga press 
released that “today for the first time [Tonga] has been elected 
by State Members of the International Seabed Authority to a 
seat on the Authority’s Council” (Government of Tonga, 2014).  
“The Assembly, in an uncontested election, renewed almost 
half of the membership of the Authority’s 36-member Council, 
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for a four-year term from 2015 through [to] 2018” with Fiji 
being re-elected for a second term, and Tonga newly elected 
(International Seabed Authority, 2014b).  As the authorising 
and regulating body of seabed mining licenses and resource 
extraction activities at high seas under the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1983, the International Seabed Authority ruled 
the international waters beyond the 200 mile exclusive 
economic zones for the 193 member states to the United 
Nations. 
Council seating arrangements were highly political and 
somewhat significant to decoding which countries were 
assigned certain areas of representation.  “Tonga is now a 
member state to the International Seabed Authority council,” 
said Lord Ma’afu telephoning from Tonga to update me in 
Auckland.  I already knew: “You might be in the wrong group.  
Group D where Fiji is with Jamaica speaks for small island 
developing states.  Tonga is in Group E with 18 countries to 
make up an even spread across regions.”  His retort was 
brusque: “It does not matter which group Tonga is put in.  We 
are on the council.  That is the important part.” 
But the five distinct groupings on the International Seabed 
Authority council did indicate an inventory of classifications 
assigned to various countries.  Group D corresponded to “six 
members from among developing States Parties, representing 
special interests” of which “island States” was included 
(International Seabed Authority, 2014a).  Clearly this was Fiji’s 
positioning on a council that had international governing 
authority by law, and it did give the Fijian government an 
upper hand in being a delegated country to speak exclusively 
and unequivocally for the world’s “island States” (International 
Seabed Authority, 2014a). 
 
• Six members from among developing States 
Parties, representing special interests.  The special 
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interests to be represented shall include those of States 
with large populations, States which are land-locked or 
geographically disadvantaged, island States, States 
which are major importers of the categories of minerals 
to be derived from the Area, States which are potential 
producers for such minerals and least developed 
States. (International Seabed Authority, 2014a). 
  
Tonga took a back seat in the fifth and final Group E 
which saw “eighteen members elected according to the 
principle of ensuring an equitable geographical distribution in 
the Council as a whole” (International Seabed Authority, 
2014a).  Located in the “36-member Council” on behalf of a 
“geographical region” Tonga symbolised the “Asia-Pacific,” not 
singularly Oceania.  (International Seabed Authority, 2014a, 
2014b).  By this, the “Asia-Pacific” region was dominated by 
Asian countries located on the continent, namely China, who 
doubled up as a state sponsor and exploration company of 
seabed minerals.  By no means was this “geographical region” 
of the “Asia-Pacific” typified as water world, meaning the small 
island developing states cohabiting a Pacific Ocean that Tonga 
shared side-by-side with Fiji shouldering its eastern sea 
boundary.  If the Tongan government thought it would be 
putting in the word specifically for Pacific “island States,” it 
had another think coming (International Seabed Authority, 
2014a). 
 
• Eighteen members elected according to the 
principle of ensuring an equitable geographical 
distribution of seats in the Council as a whole, provided 
that each geographical region shall have at least one 
member elected under this subparagraph.  For this 
purpose, the geographical regions shall be Africa, Asia-
Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the 
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Caribbean and Western Europe and Others. 
(International Seabed Authority, 2014a). 
 
From July 14th to the 25th of 2014, the International 
Seabed Authority assembly convened its twentieth session 
representing 165 member states as well as the European 
community, three economic organisations integrated into the 
European Union by the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon.  Thursday July 
24th saw the assembly’s full day meeting paint some detail of 
the political seascape in respect of where Pacific Island states 
positioned themselves on exploiting seabed minerals as a 
national and regional development goal.  Opinion was divided 
in two. 
Kiribati and smaller island states of low-lying atolls losing 
their landmass to rising sea at a faster rate than raised coral 
atolls and volcanic islands were cautious and reserved.  Given 
the gravity of their climate predicament, smaller island states 
considered development as sustaining physical environments 
and natural resources.  Understandably, their politics aligned 
with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN), Greenpeace International, and the Deep Sea 
Conservation Coalition (DSCC); all which were international 
environmental organisations in attendance as critical 
observers to the International Seabed Authority proceedings. 
Tonga, by comparison, perched on the other side of the 
opinion divide.  The Government of Tonga reported the Tongan 
delegation in attendance was “led by H. E. [His Excellency] Mr 
Mahe ‘U. S. Tupouniua, Tonga’s Permanent Representative 
and Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, Dr T. 
Suka Mangisi and Mr Taaniela Kula” [from the Ministry of 
Lands and Natural Resources] (Government of Tonga, 2014).  
Noted was a commendation from the Tongan state 
representatives nodding to “the partnership of its contractor 
Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd and its Director and Tonga 
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Manager Mr Paula Taumoepeau, and Nautilus Mineral’s Vice 
President for Strategic Development and Exploration Mr 
Jonathan Lowe, for the contribution and assistance they had 
provided during the [International Seabed Authority’s 
twentieth] Session” (Government of Tonga, 2014). 
Driving the Government of Tonga’s development mission to 
consolidate seabed mineral exploitation as a sustainable 
economic growth sector was “the partnership [with] its 
contractor Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd,” a Nuku’alofa based 
subsidiary company of the Canadian multinational Nautilus 
Minerals Incorporated (Government of Tonga, 2014).  Focused 
on its state sponsorship of Nautilus Minerals’ exploration 
licenses in the Clarion Clipperton fracture zone, an ocean area 
outside of Tonga’s exclusive economic zone in international 
waters of the north Pacific, Tonga angled this commercial 
venture as the government model for doing business with 
private companies from wealthy developed nations. 
Was Tonga winning on the commercial enterprise front?  
Undoubtedly, a high level of information dependency on Tonga 
Offshore Mining Limited, particularly the country director 
Paula Taumoepeau, fortified the relationship closeness and 
cosiness.  It is here that I am urged to voice a fault-finding 
probe: Was the Tongan state exercising judicious business 
sense to craft its national seabed minerals trade on one 
experience with, and guidance received from, Nautilus 
Minerals Incorporated?  Three additional companies to 
Nautilus were contracted by the Tongan government as the 
state sponsor (Brown Pulu, 2013a). 
Why privilege Nautilus Minerals and take no notice of the 
others?  Was it not wiser to amass information from extensive 
sources to draft national legislation and regulations on seabed 
minerals, specifically for protecting the state against liability 
for environmental loss and damage?  Why put all the business 
eggs in the Nautilus basket?  Nautilus, the company reliant on 
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the Tongan state as a mainstay sponsor for seabed exploration 
and exploitation in the Pacific Ocean.  Nautilus, whose 
Solwara project in partnership with the Papua New Guinea 
state collapsed from what local communities saw as one-sided 
financial benefits to the company measured against meagre 
royalties for the country. 
Surveying the assembly’s July 24th discussion, Vanuatu 
and the Cook Islands which were larger South Pacific states 
made up of raised atolls appeared quick off the mark to side 
with countries in favour of seabed exploitation.  There was a 
catch decelerating the push to commercially exploit 
hydrothermal vents on the ocean floor for polymetallic nodules 
containing gold, silver, copper, manganese, nickel, cobalt and 
zinc.  The International Seabed Authority had no work code 
systematising the legal obligations, technical regulations, and 
monitoring processes for exploitation.  Adding pressure to this 
tight spot was the fact that small island developing states did 
not possess national legislation and technical regulations for 
deep sea mineral exploration and exploitation.   
Without a seabed minerals act, how could the Tongan 
state protect itself from Nautilus Minerals Incorporated when 
it boiled down to liability for environmental damage to the 
ocean floor in international waters?  In the South Pacific sub-
region, the larger island states stood apart from their smaller 
island Micronesian peers, with the Cook Islands articulating 
they wanted the International Seabed Authority to devise an 
“exploitation code” pronto.  Exploitation “would lead us all” not 
into temptation but “into the next exciting phase of the work,” 
so they assumed (ISA Press Release, 2014c, p. 2). 
 
Cuba, Italy, Spain and Vanuatu all shared the view 
that developing the regulations for the exploitation of 
deep seabed minerals should be a priority task on the 
Authority’s agenda.  Cook Islands said the exploitation 
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code would “lead us all into the next exciting phase of 
the work of the Authority.” (ISA Press Release, 2014c, 
p. 2).  
 
Kiribati slammed on the brakes, requesting the 
International Seabed Authority to prioritise “the speedy 
implementation of [an] environmental management plan” (ISA 
Press Release, 2014c, p. 2).  In particular, they honed in on 
“the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone” where the majority of 
seabed licenses had been issued for exploration in the Pacific 
Ocean’s international waters (ISA Press Release, 2014c, p. 2).  
Perceptibly, Kiribati’s close proximity to the zone, compounded 
by President Anote Tong’s conviction his entire country would 
be climate refugees in fifty years’ time, presented double cause 
for concern. 
 
Members cited the protection of the marine 
environment as an ongoing priority for the Authority.  
Kiribati called for the speedy implementation of [an] 
environmental management plan in the Clarion-
Clipperton Fracture Zone. (ISA Press Release, 2014c, p. 
2). 
 
The influential environmental organisations on the world 
stage took the stand as observers to the International Seabed 
Authority’s twentieth assembly, dividing up the labour into 
three arguments laid out on the discussion table.  Up first was 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
whose Oceania programme was the organisation’s largest to be 
regionally funded and operated by staff based in Suva, Fiji.  
Their argument forthrightly backed Kiribati.  Primarily, the 
“environmental management plans” had to be instated and 
operable for areas subject to “exploration activities” such as 
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the north Pacific’s “Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone” (ISA 
Press Release, 2014c, pp. 2-3). 
 
The International Union for [the] Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) aligned itself with those delegations 
[such as Kiribati] which called for the development of 
environmental management plans in areas where 
exploration activities were taking place. (ISA Press 
Release, 2014c, p. 3).  
 
Second was a bone of seabed contention addressed by 
Greenpeace International.  Liability for environmental “damage 
occurring as a result of seabed mining” and the “disposal of 
waste at sea” must be written into “international law and 
regulation” (ISA Press Release, 2014c, p. 4).  In turn, this 
would be forcible on sponsoring states and the rationale by 
which they crafted their national legislation and seabed 
mining regulations. 
 
The Greenpeace International representative 
pointed to two gaps in international law and regulation 
which had to be filled by the time the exploitation 
regulations were in place.  The first was the issue of 
liability and redress in relation to damage occurring as 
a result of seabed mining.  The other gap to be 
addressed was the issue of disposal of waste at sea. 
(ISA Press Release, 2014c, p. 4). 
 
Third was perhaps the complicated argument to apply to 
Pacific Island states.  I emphasise intricacy because the 
physicality and geography of Pacific Island states resembles 
large ocean territories with overlapping and contested 
exclusive economic zones, and competing continental shelf 
claims.  The Deep Sea Conservation Coalition brought up the 
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organisation’s core business, “governing deep sea fisheries” 
(ISA Press Release, 2014c).  Complexly, the reality was the 
international administration of deep sea fisheries and minerals 
crossed-over into one another’s management of natural 
resources extracted from the world’s oceans and seas.  The 
tricky part was how to coordinate the two systems of 
standardising and regulating the different natural resources, 
minerals and fish, so they did not collide and cancel each 
other out. 
 
Deep Sea Conservation Coalition pointed out that 
global consensus had already been achieved on a 
number of measures governing deep sea fisheries, 
which might be relevant to the management of deep 
seabed mining.  The representative said that one of the 
overarching objectives of establishing international 
standards on the management of activities in the 
seabed must the avoidance of damage to the 
ecosystem.  He added that the Authority should aim at 
consistency with other regulatory bodies. (ISA Press 
Release, 2014c, p. 4). 
 
Fisheries was the Pacific Island states’ development 
industry that turned Lord Ma’afu uneasy.  He wanted to 
balance his familiarity of seabed minerals with sea cucumber, 
making an educated guess that fisheries activists whether 
coastal or deep sea, could band together if they felt the 
fledgling deep sea mining business threatened ecosystems on 
which their established sectors generated livelihoods and food 
supplies for Pacific Islander fishermen and coastal 
communities.  There were urgent questions to which Tonga’s 
Minister for Lands and Natural Resources sought answers. 
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Lord Nuku of Kolonga who is the nobles’ representative for 
‘Eua walking the foreshore fronting his coastal village in 
Tonga’s eastern district.  Lord Nuku and Kolonga people 
currently applying to the Minister for Fisheries to become 
a designated special management area under the Fisheries 
Management Act 2002, granting the village community 
rights to sustainably manage a 2.4 mile long foreshore to 
conserve inshore fisheries.  Photograph by Teena Brown 
Pulu, 2013. 
Vitally, what unresolved arguments had the potential to 
thwart Tonga’s seabed minerals trade from travelling full 
steam ahead into the exploitation of polymetallic nodules for 
commercial sale?  Subsequent to this where, concisely, did 
tensions arise from practicing these two development 
industries, fisheries and seabed minerals?  Hence, Ma’afu and 
his queries arrived at the Pacific Beche-de-mer and the Future 
of Coastal Fisheries Meeting in Nadi, Fiji from August 6th to 
the 8th 2014 as the Tongan Prime Minister’s special envoy and 
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stand-in for the Minister for Agriculture, Food, Forests and 
Fisheries, Sangster Saulala.  
Day one of the three-day talkfest saw Moses Amos of the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community set the sobering mood 
and tone.  Painting the bleakest future for the survival of 
inshore fisheries stock in coastal communities of Pacific Island 
states and territories, Amos hinted at extinction in graphic 
terms.  Leading a panel discussion at the Pacific Beche-de-mer 
and the Future of Coastal Fisheries Meeting on August 6th 
2014, he predicted what was yet to come as “leading to a 
perfect storm” (IUCN, 2014c). 
 
Overfishing, population growth, rapid urbanization, 
habitat degradation and climate change are all leading 
to a ‘perfect storm’ for coastal fisheries in the Pacific 
Islands region, which means that many Pacific Island 
countries and territories will need to find alternative 
sources of protein for their population within the next 
two decades.  This sombre reality was presented to the 
Pacific Beche-de-mer and the Future of Coastal 
Fisheries Meeting in Nadi, Fiji, this morning by Mr 
Moses Amos, Director of Fisheries, Aquaculture and 
Marine Ecosystems (FAME) division at the Secretariat of 
the Pacific Community (SPC). (IUCN, 2014c). 
 
At a glance, it looked rich that Ma’afu who had 
metamorphosed from a climate campaigner to the seabed 
minerals minister was in attendance for the Tongan state at a 
regional sea cucumber and coastal fisheries forum organised 
by conservationists, namely the International Union of the 
Conservation of Nature (Ministry of Environment and 
Communications, 2014).  Tonga, however, had no option but 
to front up as a co-host country together with Fiji and the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands. 
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Fiji’s capital Suva provided a hub for the regional polity 
organisations, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community.  Suva, Fiji was also the 
non-government organisation base for the Oceania office of the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, and 
various environmental advocacy groups concerned with the 
ocean and coastal protection of species and ecosystems.  By 
comparison, the Marshall Islands was a smaller island state 
advocate for sustainable fisheries at coastal community and 
deep sea levels of activity.   
Thrown in the mix was Tonga, who seemed oddly placed 
among the big hitters of Pacific Island states; small island 
developing states that showed backbone when it came to 
affirming fisheries conservation as significant to their 
population’s survival.  To be brutally honest, Tonga had no 
stand-alone fisheries ministry or department, and nor was it 
likely to get one under the Tu’ivakano administration.  
Fisheries was a small division of a ministry that conflated 
agriculture, food, forests, and fisheries into a single 
government agency for farmers and fishermen alike.  
Unrealistically, the Tongan state assumed the work methods 
and environments of the two sectors were similar enough to be 
managed under one roof, which was simply not true in 
practice.  In the end, agriculture took priority in preferment 
and funding, and fisheries by contrast dwindled. 
Politically, the nitty-gritty talk at the Beche-de-mer and the 
Future of Coastal Fisheries Meeting conveyed double-edged 
action.  First, the sole emphasis on sea cucumber and inshore 
fisheries of coastal communities in Pacific Island states was a 
deliberate strategy.  Shifting ministerial dialogue away from 
the commercial industry of tuna and deep sea fishing, it 
refocused on managing sustainable food supplies for villages 
and outer islands. 
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On the regional table was the toil and trouble of everyday 
life; the difficulty of feeding households and communities by 
foraging, gathering, and diving for seafood in reefs, lagoons, 
and foreshores.  The lived reality was that village shores and 
beaches no longer supported the high level of use and 
extraction of fish, shellfish, molluscs, and crustaceans. 
 
Shifting to sustainable management of these 
resources will be the main topic of discussion at the 
Pacific Beche-de-mer and the Future of Coastal 
Fisheries Meeting in Nadi, Fiji, from 6 to 8 August 2014.  
The meeting of fisheries ministers is being co-hosted by 
the Governments of Fiji, Tonga and the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands.  It aims to build collective will in the 
region to start managing these resources appropriately, 
so that they remain available for future generations. 
(IUCN, 2014d). 
 
Second was a call to action communique released at the 
meeting’s conclusion by seven government ministers 
representing the Pacific Island states of Fiji, Tonga, the 
Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Cook Islands, Vanuatu, and 
Papua New Guinea.  Set out in the co-signed document were 
recommendations on the advice of key representatives from 
the International Union of the Conservation for the Nature, the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, as well as consultants 
and government officials from fisheries ministries.   
The seven ministers’ endorsements were organised around 
pushing on the regional front for Pacific Island states to adopt 
a synchronised tactic for systematically managing coastal 
fisheries, particularly beche-de-mer as a commercial income 
earner.  And here lay the riddle of commercial versus 
community resource management. 
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By one mode of operation, the “regional initiative” put 
forward was oriented in improving the product quality, the 
supply chain value to the Asian market, and cash returns to 
Pacific Island states for beche-de-mer (IUCN, 2014a).  
Succinctly, sea cucumber was a sustainable profit-making 
export producing millions of dollars for poor local economies.  
Unambiguously, this was commercial resource management of 
sea cucumber targeted for Asian buyers. 
 
A regional initiative that helps achieve sustainable 
management of beche-de-mer  resources will be 
investigated, with willing countries working together to 
share information and data on buyers and identify 
market mechanisms to improve the value of the product 
to Pacific Island countries. (IUCN, 2014a). 
 
By a different method altogether the director of the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature Oceania 
office, Taholo Kami, described the Pacific Beche-de-mer and the 
Future of Coastal Fisheries Meeting as linked to the promotion 
of “locally managed marine areas” (Coutts, 2014b).  Ambiguity 
blurred the coastal fisheries agenda.   
Tonga’s Fisheries Management Act 2002 referred to “locally 
managed marine areas” as special management areas (Coutts, 
2014b).  Effectively, these were designated foreshores fronting 
villages and outer island settlements which coastal 
communities harvested daily for subsistence seafood.  Under 
the Fisheries Management Act 2002, coastal communities in 
Tonga could lodge a formal application to the Minister for 
Fisheries to control and manage the inshore fisheries of their 
allocated foreshore area. 
Confusingly, two political memos emerged from dialogue 
exchanged at the Pacific Beche-de-mer and the Future of 
Coastal Fisheries Meeting.  Commercial management of beche-
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de-mer as a lucrative export regulated by government fisheries 
regimes on cultivation, harvesting, and export sale was one 
case.  In some ways, however, it was a commercial 
development strategy contradicted by Kami’s remarks.  
“Locally managed marine areas” presented practicable and 
workable systems of coastal fisheries management that could 
be increased throughout Pacific Island states, suggested the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature director 
(Coutts, 2014b). 
 
Like I said locally managed marine areas, I think 
there’s over two thousand in the Pacific; it started here 
in Fiji and the Solomons, Micronesia.  These are when a 
village chief says look, for this one square kilometre it’s 
important for the recovery of the species or the 
ecosystem that there is a no-take, and declares a no-
take for several years and the village people respect 
that.  And they’re finding in Samoa and in other 
countries where they’re monitoring them that it’s 
actually improved the fishery around the no-take zone.  
And completely managed with technical help from 
fisheries departments, from NGOs, and others the 
villagers have been able to see some recovery of species 
and they’ve seen some impact in things like size of fish. 
(Taholo Kami cited in Coutts, 2014b).  
 
Kami threw out the catchphrase “political will for action” 
in the convoluted midst of conflicting standpoints (Coutts, 
2014b).  Had the Pacific Beche-de-mer and the Future of 
Coastal Fisheries Meeting petitioned Pacific Island states to 
step up the commercial quality and supply of beche-de-mer, or 
expand the number of “locally managed marine areas?” 
(Coutts, 2014b).  If tightening up government regulation of 
beche-de-mer harvesting and export sales clashed with 
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loosening up coastal areas for community management, then 
how would the two methods of coastal fisheries sustainable 
management be settled?  In short, who knows? 
 
I think it’s an issue, in this one I hope we start to 
get more to raise the bar in terms of political will for 
action.  I think there are clear answers, and it’s the 
whole thing of zoning, starting to recognise what [are] 
the critical areas for spawning, and what are the 
controls and management that needs to be put in; what 
needs to be no-take versus managed, better managed 
fishery areas; how do we bring communities on board 
effectively.  And we’ve got good examples of what 
works right throughout the Pacific.  And the issue 
becomes how do we this better, and in some cases it’s 
not just these little declarations but also government 
stepping in and saying there’s some offshore areas, 
and bigger areas that need to be better managed. 
(Taholo Kami cited in Coutts, 2014b). 
 
To trace back to Ma’afu’s anxiety that coastal and deep sea 
fisheries might, if left up in the air, crash head-on into seabed 
mineral exploitation, Kami outlined the contours of where the 
debate was headed.  “It’s the whole thing of zoning,” he 
impressed (Coutts, 2014b).  “Better managed fisheries areas” 
worked on two counts (Coutts, 2014b).  Bringing “the 
communities on board” to self-govern their own coastal 
fisheries was the first policy, and the second involved Pacific 
Island governments assigning “offshore areas, and bigger [deep 
sea] areas that need to be better managed” (Coutts, 2014b). 
The “whole thing of zoning” intersected with Ma’afu’s 
ministerial authority over lands and natural resources to 
direct the seabed mineral industry from exploration and 
identifying potential polymetallic excavation sites into full-
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scale exploitation for commercial sale (Coutts, 2014b).  If the 
Tongan state selected ocean spaces within its exclusive 
economic zone to be managed exclusively as conservation 
areas for migratory species such as tuna, then deep sea 
fisheries zoning would indeed limit and contest the area size 
set aside for seabed mineral activity. 
Was there a United Nations convention governing the 
protection of migratory species in national and international 
waters?  The concise answer was yes.  The Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 1983 was 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
authorising body of which Tonga was classified as a non-party 
range state. 
By this, the Tongan state had yet to give its assent to ratify 
the convention, which in turn, would make it a fully-fledged 
party state.  Notably, a conference of parties’ workshop for the 
Pacific region was held in Nadi, Fiji from the 18th to the 20th 
August 2014 to consider the United Nations draft strategic 
plan for migratory species to be put in place from 2015 to 
2023. 
One thing was certain in the middle of hazy fisheries 
policymaking.  Collectively, if Pacific Island states steered a 
regional plan convincing countries to designate national 
“offshore areas” specifically for fisheries management, Ma’afu 
would be compelled to go into bat for his ministry.  As the 
Minister for Lands and Natural Resources, he would be held 
responsible for laying down the set of circumstances in which 
zoning overlapped with, and conceivably constricted, the 
development of Tonga’s seabed minerals industry. 
 
Source of regional instability 
“No, leave the constitution alone.  The last thing we want is for 
every government that comes in here to be changing the 
constitution.  How many years have we had this constitution?”  
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“A hundred and thirty nine years.”  I answered the question 
Ma’afu put to me literally, although it was not a matter-of-fact 
inquisition.  He was making a point, rather than plainly 
soliciting a correct response. 
Gesturing to a popular belief that the durability of Tonga’s 
1875 constitution had provided the cornerstone of peace and 
stability, he scorned at how since the 2010 reform, statutory 
amendments knocked the country and citizens off-balance.  
Ma’afu regretted that in four short years, changes to the 
political system produced an opposite effect.  In actual fact, 
reform struck dissolutely at Tonga’s modern foundation.  The 
perpetuity of the monarch and the ruling class captured in a 
19th century constitution that had endured, undisrupted, for 
well over a century, characterised Tonga as Tongan citizens 
understood it. 
His sentiments had academic backing.  Ian Campbell, a 
Pakeha New Zealander and history professor wrote that 
despite Tonga being predominantly viewed by outsiders, 
Westerners in particular, as “an anomaly in the world” 
because it was a constitutional monarchy where the King 
retained executive powers, “by no means [was it] self-evident 
that this constitution is inappropriate” (Campbell, 2004, p. 
335).   
Campbell’s argument went further to problematise 
Western notions that “democracy and republicanism” naturally 
engendered development and progress (Campbell, 2004, p. 
335).  There was nothing natural about this political ideology; 
it was completely manufactured and imposed on developing 
countries by global forces of power.  If anything, the Tongan 
example of a monarch who “exercises significant authority” 
according to a 19th century constitution proved this worldwide 
belief to be quite mistaken (Campbell, 2004, p. 335). 
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It is, however, by no means self-evident that this 
constitution is inappropriate, and a strong argument 
can be made that the quality of life enjoyed by Tongans 
under this constitution is superior, by conventional 
indicators, to that of most other Pacific Islanders and 
other ‘third world’ populations. (Campbell, 2004, p. 
335). 
 
If the “quality of life enjoyed by Tongans under this [1875] 
constitution [was by any means] superior” to other Pacific 
Island states, then arguably the Land Act 1988 buttressed the 
general wellbeing of citizens linked to a country’s standard of 
living (Campbell, 2004, p. 335).  As I have written elsewhere, 
the conventional wisdom widely held by Tongans, especially 
the nobility who constituted the landed gentry, was that the 
Native land tenure system in which land could not be bought 
or sold, but rather, leased from government and estate-
holders, prohibited land privatisation and outright sales to 
non-Tongans (Brown Pulu, 2011, 2014b).   Principles 
governing Native land tenure outlined in the constitution made 
it plain as day that by no means whatsoever was land to be 
sold outright because, “All the land is the property of the King 
and he may at pleasure grant to the nobles and titular chiefs 
or matabules [matapule, titled orator or minor chief] one or 
more estates to become their hereditary estate” (Kingdom of 
Tonga, 1988b, p. 30).  
 
It is hereby declared by this Constitution that it 
shall not be lawful for anyone at any time hereafter 
whether he be the King or any one of the chiefs or the 
people of this country to sell any land whatever in the 
Kingdom of Tonga but they may lease it only in 
accordance with this Constitution and mortgage it in 
accordance with the Land Act.  And this declaration 
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become a covenant binding on the King and the chiefs 
of this Kingdom for themselves and their heirs and 
successors for ever. (Kingdom of Tonga, 1988b, p. 30). 
 
Keeping foreigners at bay by preventing them from 
purchasing land, or worse than that, owning more land than 
the locals was looked upon as constitutionally upholding 
Tongan morality and integrity.  Tongans who had migrated 
and resettled overseas, however, hinted at land reform with 
stauncher conviction than Tongans living in the homeland 
state remarked on.  Principally, their idea was to restructure 
land tenure to stop the nobility collecting millions of dollars 
from commercial leases (Brown Pulu, 2014b). 
Melino Maka, chair of the Tonga Advisory Council in 
Auckland, New Zealand held a firm opinion on the matter.  
Maka argued that “land of national interest” such as 
Fua’amotu International Airport which raised considerable 
rent paid-out to the noble and estate-holder Kalaniuvalu, 
should go back to the Government of Tonga “to keep the 
airport costs down for the public” (Brown Pulu, 2014b, p. 
141).  “Land of national interest,” by his decree, “should 
benefit” the Tongan public “not the noble” (Brown Pulu, 
2014b, p. 141). 
 
Land of national interest has to be brought up to 
inform the people.  The nobles, the amount of money 
Kalaniuvalu received from government for the airport 
lease at Fua’amotu.  Rent made by the noble should go 
back to the government to keep the airport costs down 
for the public.  The public should benefit from land of 
national interest, not the noble living in luxury. (Melino 
Maka cited in Brown Pulu, 2014b, p. 141). 
 
Minerals and Cucumbers in the Sea 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
437 
Sefita Hao’uli, Tongan veteran broadcaster in Auckland, 
New Zealand explained the adjoining part linked to Melino 
Maka’s rationale.  Conventionally, the nobility’s role in the 
social hierarchy was to allocate land allotments equitably to 
commoners living on their estates.  If the traditional ruling 
class could no longer fulfil their duty of fairly and prudently 
redistributing land to their people first and foremost, then they 
served little purpose in Tongan society (Brown Pulu, 2014b, p. 
141). 
 
Land has become a problematic area for Tongans.  
Tupou V gathered opinion through the Land 
Commission report.  People are scrambling for land but 
the point is, land is of no use to the nobles if nobody 
likes the nobles.  If land can’t be dealt with fairly by 
rules for the benefit of all then the nobles do not have a 
role.  Effectively, they have made themselves 
redundant. (Sefita Hao’uli cited in Brown Pulu, 2014b, 
p. 141). 
 
For Ma’afu, his deep-seated apprehension pointed to a 
zealous undercurrent brimming below the surface of Tongan 
political life.  Categorically it could be read that his military 
education was the method he used to scrutinise the confusion 
Tonga was experiencing by tweaking the constitution under 
the impression of making improvements.  The unrest he 
sensed was national security, a strategic interpretation of how 
dishevel inside the state could, if left unchecked, exacerbate 
ongoing political unpredictability to the radical edge where 
Tonga became “a source of regional instability” (Campbell, 
2004, p. 335). 
In Tonga, citizens were exceptionally proud of the longevity 
and fortitude of their 1875 constitution.  They also found unity 
in their shared history of an ancient Tongan civilisation 
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structured by dynastic rulers, chiefs, and clans.  Together, 
Tonga’s constitution and ancient civilization produced the 
social glue of national identity.  Accordingly, it was beyond an 
ordinary Tongan’s understanding that domestic politics were 
hinging on the extreme, crazed with a taste for subverting and 
weakening state and society.  Unravelling this contentious 
point, Ian Campbell penned it concisely. 
 
[The] perception of Tonga as politically and socially 
archaic [is commonplace], and that as such it is likely 
sooner or later to experience the pangs, not to say 
upheavals, of a lurch into the modern world in 
circumstances that could make it a source of regional 
instability.  If ‘security’ is an issue for the Pacific 
Islands, it concerns this question of internal disorder 
having a capacity to infect the internal affairs of 
neighbouring countries, an interpretation which has 
some limited empirical support. (Campbell, 2004, p. 
335). 
 
Considering the “question of internal disorder having a 
capacity to infect the internal affairs of neighbouring 
countries,” was Tonga a basket case? (Campbell, 2004, p. 
335).  A leading theory framed Fiji not Tonga as the culprit 
whose “internal disorder” threatened to contaminate the South 
Pacific’s trouble spots by influencing domestic politics inside 
fragile states.  Did Tonga now eclipse Fiji?   
By this, a political tug-o-war emerged between commoner 
and noble politicians as to whether further constitutional 
reform was necessary.  Democratic Party parliamentarians 
contended the political system had to correlate with what the 
people wanted, which was to completely abolish the nine 
nobles’ representative seats, or downsize them to three seats 
in the legislature elected by registered voters on the general 
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roll; not that the majority of Tongan voters supported ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva’s leadership and party politics.   
Sione Taione, the people’s representative for Tongatapu 
constituency number 8 pushed to amplify constitutional 
reform.  The evening of Tuesday 19th August 2014 saw 
Taione’s private member’s bill enter the House.  He vied to 
amend the constitution by pruning back the nobles’ privileges.  
Taione wanted people’s representatives to parliament, not 
singly nobles’ representatives, to be eligible for the roles of 
Speaker of the House and the Deputy Speaker of the House; 
positions that historically were set aside exclusively for the 
nobility (Radio Tonga, 2014; Tonga Hansard, 2014a).  The 
question, therefore, was had the tussle to win control over 
political uncertainty caused a deadlock that delivered no real 
solution for moving forward? 
Different to the Feleti Sevele government of 2006 to 2010, 
the Tu’ivakano regime in office from December 2010 to 
November 2014 exerted a deliberate clampdown on snipping 
and clipping the constitution.  The Prime Minister Lord 
Tu’ivakano and the Minister for Lands and Natural Resources 
Lord Ma’afu had served in Sevele’s cabinet.  They were curtly 
aware that rushing significant legislation changes through the 
House in a mad dash before the cut-off date could potentially 
do more harm in the long run than good. 
Being nobles’ representatives to parliament, Tu’ivakano 
and Ma’afu were strongly inclined to preserve the nineteenth 
century liberal principles engraved in the 1875 constitution 
and duplicated in the Land Act.  Primarily, the statute on land 
law guaranteed their landed gentry privilege to inherit titles 
and estates as noblemen, and to bequeath the class privilege 
of male birth right and inherited land holdings to their eldest 
sons. 
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Any land granted as an hereditary estate shall 
descend to the lawful heirs of the body of the grantee.  
…Upon the death of a holder of an hereditary estate … 
His Majesty shall cause the name of the lawful 
successor to the title to be published in the Gazette 
together with the date of his succession. (Kingdom of 
Tonga 1988c, pp. 20, 23). 
 
The constitution’s 19th century codes reflected Christian 
morality of the time, which is still practiced by the majority of 
church-going Tongans today.  In context, a noble’s illegitimate 
offspring were precluded from inheriting title and land by 
paternity.  As the constitution prescribed, the eldest son 
produced from a noble’s first legal marriage (as the landed 
gentry were permitted to divorce in a court of law) became 
automatically eligible for hereditary birth right. 
 
The following is the law of succession to hereditary estates 
and titles: 
Children lawfully born in wedlock only may inherit 
and the eldest male child shall succeed and the heirs of 
his body but if he have no descendants then the second 
male child and the heirs of his body and so on until all 
the male line is ended. (Kingdom of Tonga, 1988b, pp. 
31-32). 
   
What is more, the monarch’s pivotal position in the 
constitutional arrangement to hold and exercise executive 
power was fundamental to Tonga continuing to function as a 
South Pacific Kingdom in the 21st century.  To be concise, 
preservation was about maintaining a constitutional monarchy 
that upheld Tonga’s political structure.  Affirming the 
traditional ruling class and the commoners would both be 
represented in parliament, and that the nobles’ privileges 
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warranted in the Act of Constitution of Tonga coupled with the 
Land Act remained intact, were central to a constitutional 
monarchy’s meaning and purpose. 
The current government policy steered clear of Sevele’s 
gung-ho approach.  When it came to another round of 
reworking the constitution, their motto was to make haste 
slowly.  Irony was at play.  Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano and 
his eleven ministers found that during their four-year term, 
they were to submit to the legislature a trail of constitutional 
rectifications to the 2010 amendments to the Act of 
Constitution of Tonga: 1988 Revised Edition, which the Sevele 
government before them had ratified.  Put simply, the 
Government of Tonga ended up correcting the corrections to 
the constitution which the former government had brought 
about. 
To explain the background fertilising a baffling situation 
the Tu’ivakano cabinet faced in parliament, under pressure to 
make political reform happen in a limited timeframe, the 
former Prime Minister Sevele railroaded through hasty 
alterations to Tonga’s constitution during the parliamentary 
session of 2010.  In total, forty eight bills passed into 
legislation in the four months parliament sat, and it was 
rumoured that some of the bills explicitly to do with political 
reform were not discussed by the Whole House Committee 
representing the legislative assembly.  Of the three 
amendment acts to the Act of Constitution of Tonga: 1988 
Revised Edition, it was the third sanctioned into law by King 
George Tupou V on September 24th 2010 that instigated 
internal and external reviews carried out from 2012 to 2014 
on “the practical operation of the reforms” in relation to the 
judiciary (Tonga Daily News, 2014b). 
The story unfolded that in 2012, the Tu’ivakano cabinet 
requested the Ministry of Justice to “report on the new judicial 
system” reorganised under the Sevele administration’s 2010 
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constitutional amendments (Tonga Daily News, 2014b).  The 
ministry’s “report identified flaws,” but the external report was 
far worse (Tonga Daily News, 2014b).  “The present 
Constitution of Tonga can lay claim to being the most poorly 
structured and drafted Constitution of any Country in the 
Commonwealth,” wrote constitutional law consultant Peter 
Pursglove (Moala, 2014).  He had been recommended as the 
man for the job.  Tonga approached the Commonwealth 
organisation of 53 member states who were once politically 
affiliated to the colonial British Empire, of which 31 were small 
island developing states.  Asking the Commonwealth for 
assistance on the matter, they got Pursglove. 
Superior to any recommendations the Ministry of Justice 
had given to cabinet; almightier than any views expressed by 
Tonga’s law practitioners working inside the homeland state; 
was Pursglove’s review.  He was the trigger for action, obliging 
the Government of Tonga to amend what was depicted as a 
dodgy constitution authorising a lop-sided judiciary.  My point 
is the all-knowing power and persuasion of international 
relations fashioned the Tongan bureaucracy over and above 
the influence of national politics, internal relations, and public 
opinion.  What Tongan citizens thought of their own country 
and government was truly peripheral.  The verdict taken 
seriously was the outside world’s judgement of Tonga. 
According to Pursglove, Western notions that the modern 
state’s three branches of authority, the legislature, national 
executive, and judiciary functioned independently from one 
another, but at the same time, were transparent and 
accountable to each other’s operation as an interconnected 
system of governing power, did not happen in Tonga.  A post 
2010 judiciary had splintered into three unfeasible and 
contradictory parts, in addition to the Ministry of Justice. 
In short, the Sevele government’s 2010 constitutional 
reform line-up instated a judiciary in triplicate.  First, there 
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was a Lord Chancellor’s Office; second, an Attorney General’s 
Office; and third, a Judicial Appointments and Discipline 
Panel (JADP) of Law Lords who doubled up as the King’s Privy 
Council.  Troubling for a revised constitution that allegedly 
moved towards democratising the state’s principles and 
processes was that the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney 
General “answer only to the King in Privy Council” (Moala, 
2014).  Democracy was amiss if indeed it had been taken to 
mean a representative system of government where citizens of 
the state exercise power and decision making by electing 
individuals to parliament to stand, act, and speak for their 
interests. 
 
While the Ministry of Justice remains accountable to 
the people through Parliament, the Office of the Lord 
Chancellor and the Office of the Attorney General are 
not publicly accountable and answer only to the King in 
Privy Council.  This is contrary to the democratic 
principles upon which the new constitution was 
founded. (Peter Pursglove cited in Moala, 2014).  
 
At a glance, the Sevele administration’s judiciary 
resembled autocracy exemplified by the ruling monarch’s 
executive power to appoint, control, and dismiss the Lord 
Chancellor, the Attorney General, and the Judicial 
Appointments and Discipline Panel (JADP).  Not to mention, 
there was the question of Law Lords constituting the Privy 
Council.  The Law Lords were not supposed to interfere in 
state governance carried out by the national executive, but 
they did assume the role of advising the monarch on whether 
to approve or refuse bills passed by parliament as statutes.  
Could that be construed as stepping on governance territory, 
or was it part-and-parcel of the King’s executive power as 
sovereign and head of state?  Tonga’s nonpartisan and self-
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regulating judiciary looked curiously like a dependent ward of 
the reigning monarch. 
Remedying the judiciary’s complicated operation got 
increasingly convoluted when in late August of 2014, Clive 
Edwards, the Minister for Justice submitted his amendments 
to the House in two bills.  Lord Nuku, in collaboration with 
Lord Tu’iha’ateiho and Lord Tu’ilakepa, led the vote against 
the justice minister’s corrections to the 2010 constitutional 
alterations completed by the Sevele government.  Upended, the 
bills returned to the Tu’ivakano cabinet for additional work 
(Fonua, 2014).  Time was running short, and a familiar 
situation looked to unfold.  Parallel to the Sevele regime’s tight 
spot, the annual parliamentary session would be flooded with 
bills pouring into a House of fatigued parliamentarians doing 
overtime.  Sitting ceaselessly through readings one after the 
other that pressed into evening, a risky edge drew near.  Could 
a few proposed laws fall off a cliff to become hurried legislation 
in which four years from now, no one recalled discussing their 
critical points of law?  
From the furore a remarkable judgement came from 
Pursglove’s criticism of the monarch’s executive power over 
Tonga’s newly devised justice system, the only one of its kind 
in the Commonwealth.  As a result it was uttered among 
Tongan writers, critics, and political analysts that the reason 
why the conservative corner of the establishment withheld 
from shooting the messenger and burying his report, so to 
figuratively speak, was because the bearer of bad news was a 
foreigner (Brown Pulu, 2011).   
Pursglove had outsider privilege by virtue of not being 
Tongan.  For if he was an insider, he would definitely think 
twice about his survival odds as a local researcher working in 
a small island Kingdom policed by class and culture; a closed, 
insular, hierarchical, patriarchal, Christianised society where 
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Voltaire’s adage rang loud and clear: “Qui plume a, guerre a.  
To hold a pen is to be at war” (Voltaire, 1748). 
Long-standing Tongan journalist Kalafi Moala quizzed, 
“who was really responsible for” restructuring the judiciary? 
(Moala, 2014a).  There was no doubt the constitutional 
modifications legislated in 2010 under the Feleti Sevele 
government gave birth to the new justice arrangement.  But 
whose brainchild was it to redesign the system?  Who actually 
gave the order to go full-steam ahead?  Furthermore, why was 
there no state record of public consultation and parliamentary 
debate on the acts to amend the Act of Constitution of Tonga: 
1988 Revised Edition with explicit reference to the judiciary’s 
makeover?   
As expected of a Tongan analysis, Kalafi Moala stopped 
short of prying whether the late King George Tupou V was an 
accomplice to “ordering the sweeping changes” (Moala, 2014a), 
in stark contrast to Pesi Fonua stating the judiciary system 
“was a creation of the late” monarch  (Fonua, 2014).  But 
Moala sensed not to go there.  If he was non-Tongan, he might 
feel uninhibited to grill the establishment for answers.  As a 
Tongan national living and working in the homeland state, he 
understood too well that interrogating power and authority 
can lend to the wisdom that some stones are better left 
unturned.  Quite simply because, by Voltaire’s estimation, “to 
learn who rules over you, simply find out who you are not 
allowed to criticize.” 
 
As Tonga’s Legislature work[s] to reverse 
legislations relating to the Judiciary as in the 2010 
Constitution, the question remains who was really 
responsible for ordering the sweeping changes to the 
judicial sector, and why were the changes carried out 
without public discussion or debated in the Legislature. 
(Moala, 2014a). 
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Woven in Moala’s questioning was Tongan nostalgia for the 
past.  “To reverse legislations relating to the Judiciary” formed 
the government and parliament’s urgent business in the 
House, remarked Moala (Moala, 2014a).  Recoiling back to pre-
2010, prior to the constitution being altered, before the 
political reform when Tonga “had a well-functioning Judiciary” 
prized by its citizens, and respected by outside observers, was 
the golden age he hinted at (Moala, 2014a).  That was the era 
of constitutional stability and strength which Pursglove noted, 
adding weight to local lamenting for what went before, and 
what Tonga needed to go back to now. 
 
Before the Constitutional reforms of 2010 ‘the 
Kingdom of Tonga had a well-functioning Judiciary that 
was independent and operated in accordance with 
recognized Constitutional Law standards.’ (Peter 
Pursglove cited in Moala, 2014a). 
 
To reiterate my position, it was a foreigner, an outsider, a 
non-T0ngan constitutional law researcher named Peter 
Pursglove who impressed upon the nation that it “is truly a 
very sad state of affairs in the Kingdom that has one of the 
world’s oldest surviving constitutions” for the Tonga to have 
slid backwards (Moala, 2014a).  Unknowingly he echoed and 
evoked sentiments that the nobility in power, Prime Minister 
Lord Tu’ivakano and Minister for Lands and Natural 
Resources Lord Ma’afu, had sensed and said all along. 
Tu’ivakano and Ma’afu had ministerial experience in two 
consecutive governments.  They were able to reflect that in two 
terms amounting to eight years, it was “truly a very sad state 
of affairs” to witness Tongan state and society dismantle the 
country’s stability that they, themselves, had engineered over 
one hundred and thirty nine years (Moala, 2014a).  Tonga 
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partly divorced culture and custom for what, precisely?  The 
country hinged on an uncertain future created by others, 
Western states mainly, perceived to be more powerful, 
desirable, and knowledgeable in worldly affairs.  On second 
thoughts, had converting from the old system to the new been 
completely advantageous? 
 
When one considers the justifiable pride felt by 
Tongans everywhere in the First Constitution handed 
down by King George Tupou I in 1875, this is truly a 
very sad state of affairs in the Kingdom that has one of 
the world’s oldest surviving constitutions. (Peter 
Pursglove cited in Moala, 2014a). 
 
 
Ambivalence of nobles in power 
Malakai Koloamatangi, a Tongan political scientist based at 
Massey University’s Albany campus in Auckland, New Zealand 
announced to Radio Australia’s Bruce Hill that “we’ve come a 
long way in fact since 2010 and even before then, when 
political reform was first talked of” (Hill, 2014).  Perceptibly, 
his Auckland location outside of Tonga would have 
considerable bearing on his views which were, by comparison 
to Tongan commentators living in the homeland state, 
uncritically optimistic that democracy had been indisputably 
“accepted” across society and “institutionalised” in the state 
structure (Hill, 2014). 
Without a doubt, the democracy conceived of and 
calculated by the Sevele government had been stylised to fit 
with, as opposed to undermine, the existing political assembly 
where the nine nobles’ representatives seats were taken to be a 
permanent characteristic of the Tongan parliament.  Kalafi 
Moala reasoned this by writing the Sevele regime figured “a 
Minerals and Cucumbers in the Sea 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
448 
more democratic structure” need not do away with “the basic 
fabric of Tongan social structure” (Moala, 2008, p. 184).  
 
The [Sevele] government seems to be seizing the 
initiative for reform.  They have indicated quite bluntly 
that reform is inevitable, and that they are working to 
reconstruct Tonga politically and economically to reflect 
a more democratic structure, without necessarily 
tearing up the basic fabric of Tongan social structure. 
(Moala, 2008, p. 184). 
 
Nevertheless, it was a sore point that turned into a 
reoccurring strain in the human psyche of Malakai 
Koloamatangi, alongside Kalafi Moala and Tongan political 
analysts slanting towards the pro-democracy movement.  
Collectively, they identified nobles’ representatives in the 
legislature, and the nobility at the government helm, as an 
uncalculated risk which had to be contained and controlled.  
By uncalculated, I mean that full consideration of what might 
result in continuing to have governments led by a noble 
premier with nobles occupying senior ministerial portfolios 
had yet to be weighed up thoroughly by commoner politicians 
and voters.   
Corresponding with this line of thinking, the landed gentry 
in power signified where the Tongan model of democracy came 
unstuck, and why the peoples’ representatives would need to 
correct the course of democratic evolution.  In 2008, Kalafi 
Moala authored an essay titled Media and Conflict in the 
Kingdom where he argued “it is only a matter of time until 
elected officials will be running the government” (Moala, 2008, 
p. 184).  
 
The issue now is no longer whether there is going to 
be reform, but that reform is taking place right now, 
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and it is only a matter of time until elected officials will 
be running the government, making government in 
Tonga finally accountable to the people while retaining 
the uniqueness of our culture and social structure. 
(Moala, 2008, p. 184). 
 
Anticipating the 2010 general election would bring about a 
government led by people’s representatives, Moala made an 
assumption that accountability “to the people” simply meant 
being elected to parliament by Tongan voters (Moala, 2008, p. 
184).  The naïve logic that winning a constituency vote 
naturally produced an answerable politician was not true by 
any democratic country’s standards.  If there was a case in 
point, then the Democratic Party’s four year term in the House 
as the Tu’ivakano government’s opposition proved that the 
political behaviour of elected commoners was evidently 
disagreeable, compared to the nobility chosen by their class 
peers who consistently voted as a unanimous bloc on bills and 
decisions in the legislature. 
The original twelve seats in the House won by the 
Democratic Party produced politicians first, and party 
members second, who as a voting bloc were answerable to no 
one.  For a left-wing organisation inclining towards socialism, 
the Democrats lacked party discipline.  Defecting 
parliamentarians crossed the floor to government, either 
holding on to their Democratic Party affiliation, or abandoning 
the party altogether to become an independent member.  This 
was compounded by private member’s bills tabled by various 
representatives for constitutional changes that were not 
consulted on, or agreed to by their constituents.  Contritely, a 
string of bills entering the House revealed a public staging of 
individual self-interest, political ego, and unabashed self-
promotion. 
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The break-up of the Democratic Party into two splinter 
groups of candidates standing for election, one led by ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva and the other by Pohiva’s former deputy ‘Isileli Pulu, 
troubled Malakai Koloamatangi.  “It doesn’t give a very good 
picture of democrats cooperating,” he confessed to Bruce Hill 
of Radio Australia (Hill, 2014a).  Entrenched was a chronic 
recurring fear that “also, of course, it gives an opportunity for 
the nobility, the nobles, to also capture power, because of the 
[Democratic Party] fragmentation” (Hill, 2014). 
 
I think though, on the other hand, that there is some 
dissension between the ranks of even the Friendly 
Islands Party Movement [Democratic Party of the 
Friendly Islands], so there is now some disunity within 
the movement and so we’re getting, we’re starting to 
see the possibility of perhaps it fragmenting and people 
go off in groups of their own and one of the problems 
with that is that it doesn’t give a very good picture of 
democrats cooperating and also, of course, it gives an 
opportunity for the nobility, the nobles, to also capture 
power, because of the fragmentation. (Malakai 
Koloamatangi cited in Hill, 2014). 
 
Why was the nobility’s collective potential to assume 
government leadership shrouded in, and contorted by, 
suspicion and scepticism?  To begin with there was Kalafi 
Moala’s belief that “elected officials [should] be running the 
government,” meaning parliamentarians elected by Tongan 
voters registered on the general roll.  An in-house election for 
Tonga’s thirty three hereditary title and estate-holders to elect 
nine nobles to parliamentary seats representing their class 
group, was now written off as undemocratic because the 
nobility were not voted in by the people. 
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The hot conversation going on in Nuku’alofa today 
is that the nine nobles’ seats must be abolished.  Why 
have nine seats for 33 nobles?  Why can’t all the 
members of parliament be people’s representatives 
elected by the people?  If a noble wants to enter 
parliament he will need to run as a people’s 
representative.  This change may not happen before 
November’s election but it promises to be the key issue 
for political reform in the next several years, definitely 
before the 2018 election. (Moala, 2014c). 
   
A hypothesis ensued: If the nobility stood for election to 
the commoners’ constituencies was there a likelihood that 
nobles well regarded by people living on their estates would be 
voted into parliament?  Could Lord Ma’afu win the people’s 
representative seat for Tongatapu 8 if he stood for Vaini 
district on his estate?  What might result from Lord Nuku 
contesting the eastern district seat for constituency Tongatapu 
10 where his estate and principal village of Kolonga was 
located?  Quite believably, yes; Ma’afu and Nuku would win 
the popular vote for Tongatapu 8 and Tongatapu 10.  Their 
own people, especially the kainga (kinfolk), would vote for 
them before a commoner.   
Given the scenario that members of the noble class could 
convincingly win people’s representatives seats, would this 
reduce the chances of commoner candidates getting elected to 
parliament?   If the nobility took out more people’s 
representative seats than the commoners, would this make the 
parliamentary electoral system more democratic in terms of 
dispersing power among the majority of ordinary Tongans?   
No, certainly not was the correct answer, which elicited 
crucial scrutiny.  Originally, the Democratic Party proposed to 
end the nobles’ election for nine seats, forcing the nobility to 
stand for parliament in the general election for seventeen 
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people’s representatives.  Midstream, the thinking shifted to 
downsizing to three seats set aside for the nobility, presenting 
a workable compromise in which the people’s representatives 
explicitly held the dominant numbers to win the prime 
minister’s election and become the government, while allowing 
a few nobles to hang in there.  Subversively, pro-democracy 
politicians had figured out the odds of getting beaten at the 
finishing post by popular nobles standing against them in the 
general election.  Devising a watertight plan B, an improved 
blueprint would let them get their hands on all the power they 
desired. 
Essentially, the Democratic Party disputed whether a 
parliamentary system with seats reserved only for the nobility 
to designate nine members of their class had a democratic 
mandate authorised by Tongan voters.  The bone they had to 
pick was rooted in grievance.  In 2010, they failed to outdo the 
nobles’ candidate at the parliamentary vote for prime minister, 
and blamed the electoral system for outdoing them.  However, 
plotting to displace the nobles from their own election and 
seats by transferring the whole lot of them to the general 
election was a redundant manoeuvre.  As a political union 
distinguished by class and culture, the nobility possessed the 
expertise to regroup and mobilise to win the majority of 
seventeen people’s representative seats. 
Propelling the flawed logic was that the Democratic Party 
and pro-democracy supporters did not count the political 
composition of chambers of parliament as relevant to Tonga 
(Shapley and Shubik, 1954).  Because the nobility and the 
commoners convened under one debating chamber forming a 
national executive from both class groups, Tonga’s legislative 
assembly did not resemble a bicameral system of an upper 
and lower house with separate functions.  Understandably 
then, conceptualising chambers of parliament was overlooked 
as an underlying principle that organised national polity and 
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governance.  The concept and practice, however, did intersect 
in Tonga’s political organisation in a subtle but none the less 
salient way. 
For all intents and purposes, meaning in every practical 
sense of how the state bureaucracy of governing power works, 
reasons, and behaves, Tonga was a unicameral structure of 
one legislative chamber.  But the one House seated two 
classes, categories, and ranks of parliamentarians whose 
cultures, customs, and civilisations purposely diverged and 
fervidly disagreed when a reappearing crop of political 
stressors materialised, heading into a general election; for 
example, the Democratic Party lobbying for Tonga to adopt 
Western liberal democracy as the national political 
arrangement. 
Contextually, timing was of strategic importance because 
campaigning for Western liberal democracy only became loud 
and disruptive to social order as an election carrot to recruit 
voters.  The intense politicking, voter canvassing, and 
politician speech-making prior to the general election held 
four-yearly triggered an excitable, emotional, and volatile 
underclass of vulnerable groups coerced into thinking 
democracy, the Western liberal kind, presented an election 
issue for all Tongans; not that it did, which is the point I am 
hammering.  Rather, it was the timeliness of the Democratic 
Party appealing to voters who saw themselves as dispossessed 
in a social hierarchy a few months out from polling day, which 
deliberately polarised and intensified class divisions in the 
legislative assembly. 
An after-effect was that ritualistically the nobility and the 
commoners kept their minds on preserving the different 
cultures, customs, and civilisations of their classes.  This 
amplified and politically manufactured over-the-top interval of 
political instability that fed, bred, and spread during an 
election year was anticipated.  The no-win situation of political 
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hostilities transacted between noble politicians and pro-
democracy politicians who were not about to resolve opposing 
stances, seemed to have deepened the class boundary in 2014, 
the year of the second election after Tonga was constitutionally 
remade more democratic.   
In one way, Kalafi Moala’s allusion to performing Tongan 
politics while “retaining the uniqueness of our culture and 
social structure” intimated around carrying on with endless 
and uncompromising class tension; frictions and factions 
produced by the structural constraints of a parliament setting 
rooming two ranks of people who, by constitutional decree, 
were afforded very different roles and responsibilities to play in 
the one system (Moala, 2008, p. 184).   
Under election pressure, the nobility converged and 
concentrated on protecting privileges guaranteed as their 
constitutional entitlement.  Equally under pressure to get re-
elected, pro-democracy people’s representatives, whether 
affiliated to the Democratic Party or independent members, 
revealed hankerings to revoke the nobles’ constitutional 
benefits of having nine parliamentary seats and roles of 
speaker and deputy speaker of the House assigned only to 
their class and kind. 
Contrary to cut-throat political enmities, Malakai 
Koloamatangi assessed Tonga’s election landscape three 
months away from November 27th polling day.  He thought 
the country had travelled some distance from setting up the 
pro-democracy movement in the 1980s through to seeing the 
2010 political reform instituted.  Tongan people in 2014, the 
ordinary voters on the general roll, had arrived at a new 
destination where they were now “looking for something 
different” in the elected parliamentarians (Hill, 2014).  They 
wanted political leadership that would give Tonga secure 
direction into an unknown future. 
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But I think people are looking for something 
different also, I think they are looking for people who 
are visionary, in a sense that, what comes after we get 
democratic government, what’s going to happen.  I 
mean how is that going to benefit the lives of people, so 
people are starting to look perhaps to the future more 
and in this election I think it shows that democracy is 
accepted and it’s been institutionalised, and whilst it 
[will] take some time for it to be culture-related in 
Tonga, people accept it for what it is and they’re moving 
forward from that. (Malakai Koloamatangi cited in Hill, 
2014). 
 
If any cultural truth existed in Koloamatangi’s assertion 
that Tongan “people are looking for something different also” 
in political candidates standing for seventeen parliamentary 
seats assigned to people’s representatives, then voters’ 
sentiments that the economy was an election urgency 
prompted the swing in preferences and priorities (Hill, 2014).  
The long running saga of the Democratic Party scheming for 
power had reached public saturation point.  To be brutally 
honest, it was a widely held assumption that ‘Akilisi Pohiva 
had done his dash as a career politician of almost thirty years, 
signifying that people were surveying the range and scale of 
candidates for newness and change; a decided and decisive 
move towards “nominative answers to Tonga’s [economic 
development] problems” at the constituency level of 
communities, villages, and districts (Hill, 2014). 
Noting this point to Bruce Hill of Radio Australia, 
Koloamatangi confessed that “people seem less interested in 
political reform these days,” and that “the economy will be an 
important issue at the election” (Hill, 2014).  Significantly, 
voters had shifted their ranking of election interests to “looking 
for answers to development problems that Tonga has.  And so 
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if someone can offer a message around that, I think [he or she] 
will be [a] very popular candidate,” announced Koloamatangi 
(Hill, 2014). 
Which brings me to suggest that Tongan voters adjusting 
their lens to look closely at the “development problems Tonga 
has” was patently motivated by international relations (Hill, 
2014).  Certainly, the horde of foreign embassies located in 
Nuku’alofa, and the reality that the Tu’ivakano government 
had pivoted to China and Asia as fundamental sources of aid 
assistance for national development projects, fashioned how 
ordinary Tongans grasped the gamut of development dilemmas 
and donors influencing their country’s economy, politics, and 
foreign policy.  
 
Sovereignty not democracy 
In the Asia-Pacific region, including the small island 
developing states, there were two models at work for modern 
state and society, bureaucracy or military.  While it was true 
that bureaucracy predominated and proliferated among the 
Pacific Island states, when it failed, the military stepped in as 
the backup to restore law and order, in theory.  Of course the 
2006 to 2014 military state central to shaping the 21st 
century regional economy and polity was the Republic of Fiji.  
Aptly, Fiji’s post-1970 political independence from the vestiges 
of a colonial British Empire, demonstrated that the 
government of a Pacific Island state brought into force by the 
armed services was capable of mobilising beyond the re-
establishment law and order into “the order of things,” 
meaning the dominant pattern of political thought and 
behaviour (Foucault, 1970). 
By this, a military leader carrying out a coup could rewrite 
the constitution, and after the coup fulfilled its political 
purpose, evade the threat of court action for executing a 
military seizure of the state, and get democratically elected to 
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government as the prime minister.  Sitiveni Rabuka’s election 
as Fiji’s third prime minister from 1992 to 1999 proved this 
was doable down-to-a-T.  In 1987, Rabuka carried out two 
military coup-de-tat deposing the coalition government of five 
political parties led by Prime Minister Dr Timoci Bavadra who 
defeated the inaugural Prime Minister Ratu Kamisese Mara’s 
Alliance Party by twenty eight seats to twenty four.  On top of 
that, he assumed Fiji’s prime ministership for two consecutive 
terms leading the Fijian Political Party government. 
A repeat of the same scene starring new political actors 
looked to screen again.  Leading up to the Fiji general election 
set for September 17th 2014, popular guesswork picked Frank 
Bainimarama and his Fiji First Party to be the favourites.  He 
had executed two coups in history; the first in putting down 
the pro-indigenous Fijian putsch of George Speight in 2000; 
and the second in 2006 deposing the elected Prime Minister 
Laisenia Qarase, a pro-indigenous Fijian politician from 
Vanuabalavu Island in the Lau group. 
An election had not been held for eight years of which 
during that time, Bainimarama reinvented his public profile 
from the military coup leader dressed in officer’s uniform who 
took over the prime minister’s office on January 5th 2007.  
Almost a decade on, he acted the part of the Republic of Fiji’s 
Prime Minister, a rare admiral and retired naval officer who 
made public reference to “the people of Fiji,” as if the history of 
race and power politics between i-Taukei [indigenous Fijians] 
and Fiji Indians had been resolved, absolved, and dissolved in 
his eight years of steering the government ship. 
This simply was not so, and what Bainimarama’s 
electioneering rallies exposed, particularly for his public 
address held at the Manukau Events Centre in Auckland, New 
Zealand on August 9th 2014, was his support base appeared 
to be somewhat racially lop-sided (Anneberg and Kata, 2014).  
Outsider observations of non-Fiji nationals expressed that 
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Bainimarama’s popular vote did not come from his own ethnic 
kind, i-Taukei.  Instead, Fiji Indians from across the religious 
divide of Hindu and Muslim gave rise to his post-coup power 
and race relations by joining forces to get him elected. 
Lord Ma’afu during the Tu’ivakano administration’s four-
year term as Minister for Lands and Natural Resources, had 
built up a regional profile as the Tongan government’s straight 
shooter.  He came out firing at Frank Bainimarama’s tactics in 
Fiji’s domestic affairs.  Ma’afu was no fan of Bainimarama’s 
2012 disestablishment of the great council of chiefs, a 
constitutional body instated in 1897 under the British 
governor Arthur Gordon.   
The council had served as a 19th century institution for 
hereditary chiefs to select and appoint Fiji’s president and vice 
president, and a clear majority of the senate’s thirty four seats.  
When the military junta assumed power in 2007, conflict 
erupted between the council’s function and Bainimarama’s 
desire to flatten racial tension between i-Taukei and Fiji 
Indians by expelling the chiefs’ authority in state governance. 
As a high-ranking hereditary chief of Tonga with kinship 
connections to the chiefly class of Fiji’s Lau group, Ma’afu’s 
view was cut-and-dry.  Here, I mean that his judgement 
reflected his class position in a hierarchical Tongan society 
ordered by chiefly rank, and in all honesty, conveyed the 
consensus of Tonga and Fiji’s aristocracy.  Ma’afu strongly 
believed the Fijian chiefs must have a say in the running of 
their country’s affairs by way of institutionalised involvement 
in state governance at the national level of decision making. 
Unflinchingly, he put it out there in public media to Fijian 
reporter for Tonga Daily News, Iliesa Tora.  The “Nobles in 
Parliament hold the key to keeping Tonga stable and peaceful,” 
he avowed (Tora, 2014).  Sharply pointing the finger at Fiji’s 
fourth constitution of September 2013 orchestrated by the 
Bainimarama regime, Ma’afu passionately disagreed with 
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eradicating the great council of chiefs, the senate, the i-Taukei 
electoral roll, and the reserved parliamentary seats for i-
Taukei.  He was adamant that “Tonga should learn from the 
Fiji situation as the push for democracy continues here in the 
Kingdom,” and not go down the same rickety path (Tora, 
2014).   
He argued bluntly if the Democratic Party carried on 
plugging for Tonga’s constitutional monarchy to convert into a 
Western liberal democracy, extinguishing the nobility from 
parliamentary representation, the state and citizens “could see 
Tonga losing out in the end” (Tora, 2014).  Without nobles in 
the legislature to act as the traditional balance of power, to 
protect land interests for ethnic Tongan nationals, and to be 
the conservative centre of the political spectrum, Tonga as its 
citizens knew it, could basically dissolve into political disorder 
collapsing the government, and cutting away at the country’s 
cultural fabric. 
 
Yes democracy is good but Tonga’s situation is 
different from New Zealand or Australia for that matter.  
The nobles in Parliament are there to help ensure that 
Tonga and what Tongans hold dear to their hearts are 
protected.  You only have to look at Fiji and see what 
has happened there and is happening with the chiefs 
there having no say in the status of the country.  That’s 
the price they are paying.  Nobles are there for a 
purpose because we look after our people. (Lord Ma’afu 
cited in Tora, 2014). 
 
A sub-text opened out.  Really, Ma’afu interrogated 
sovereignty not democracy.  His New Zealand socialisation 
experience was sounder than the Democratic Party members 
of parliament advocating for Western liberal democracy who, if 
the truth be told, had little if any first-hand experience of 
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living in a Western democratic country as a Tongan and Pacific 
Islander ethnic minority.  Migrating to New Zealand for private 
boarding school education at Wanganui Collegiate, Tonga’s 
Minister for Lands was personally familiar with the New 
Zealand political system that pro-democracy activists coveted.  
He debunked what they craved for because as he put it 
straightforwardly, “democracy is good but Tonga’s situation is 
different from New Zealand or Australia for that matter” (Tora, 
2014). 
To Ma’afu the difference, quite frankly, hinged on 
sovereignty; a term, concept, practice, a complete system of 
power constituting Tongan state and society, which for some 
illusive reason Democratic Party parliamentarians did not mull 
over when plotting to permanently rig seating arrangements in 
the House so only the commoners could be the government.  
He felt griped that missing from social memory was the 
Tongan monarch.  Written into the constitution as “the 
Sovereign of all the Chiefs and all the people,” the sovereign’s 
power centred on being the sole signatory verifying “Acts that 
have passed the Legislative Assembly” had met with his 
approval to “become law” (Kingdom of Tonga, 1988b, p. 17). 
 
41 King’s powers – Signature to Acts  
The King is the Sovereign of all the Chiefs and all 
the people.  The person of the King is sacred.  He 
governs [amended in 2010 to “He reigns”] the 
country but ministers are responsible.  All Acts that 
have passed the Legislative Assembly must bear the 
King’s signature before they become law. (Kingdom of 
Tonga, 1988b, p. 17). 
   
Personifying the sovereign’s authority, therefore, were the 
dual executive powers of head of state and commander in chief 
of His Majesty’s Armed Forces.  Unequivocally, the King of 
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Tonga embodied national sovereignty; sovereignty defined as a 
Tongan, not Western European, constitutional monarchy.  And 
here lay Ma’afu’s piercing point: Was it not hypocritical for 
pro-democracy campaigners to pay token lip-service to 
practicing a democracy that averts “tearing up the basic fabric 
of Tongan social structure” when in real politik that is exactly 
what was planned? (Moala, 2008, p. 184).   
By Ma’afu’s judgement, the Democratic Party had 
surreptitiously shown no resolve to preserve true national 
sovereignty by “retaining the uniqueness of our culture and 
social structure” (Moala, 2008, p. 184).  To him, they looked 
and behaved like a spurious version of culture and society.  
Purposefully they adopted a quasi-Western political 
consciousness, and double-dealt the poorest of the common 
class by telling them it was suited to Tongan sovereignty and 
way of life.  Plainly, they were duped and intent on duping 
those of a weak financial and social position in the hierarchy 
to garner political support. 
The unique feature about Tongan sovereignty was that the 
monarch and the nobility were written into the constitution in 
unison.  The “covenant binding on the King and chiefs of this 
Kingdom for themselves and their heirs and successors for 
ever,” as the constitution proclaimed, was that Tonga’s lands 
were effectively “the property of the King” which he conferred 
on the nobility, including matapule (minor chiefs), as “their 
hereditary estates” to remain in their male lineage from father 
to eldest son (Kingdom of Tonga, 1988b, p. 30).  As indicative 
of 19th century missionary Christianity as the Act of 
Constitution of Tonga was, the biblical notion that this 
covenant obligated the King to the nobles and vis-à-vis wholly 
fortified and armour-plated Tongan sovereignty in the present-
day.   
Reading Ma’afu closely and carefully, he connoted that for 
pro-democracy politicians to even suggest subtracting the 
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nobility from the parliamentary equation weakened the 
sovereign’s constitutional right to reign in conjunction with the 
landed gentry’s patronage.  Essentially, this was the 
destructive force in Tongan political life; an attack on 
sovereignty.  Why would a titled noble with a hereditary estate 
by constitutional law, a Minister of Lands and Natural 
Resources, and a former military officer of His Majesty’s Armed 




Endnote on the end 
Sincerely, I did not intend to give prominence to Lord Ma’afu’s 
international relations efforts as Tonga’s Minister for Lands 
and Natural Resources in this essay.  The truth is that going 
on three years since I first published the journal article called, 
Ma’afu’s Word is in the Hills: What is a Noble’s Role in a 
Democratised Tonga? in 2012, I have written seventeen essays 
on Tonga’s development all up; this one included.  Looking 
back, Ma’afu was and is central to my authorship.   
For this article, his work at regional level for seabed 
minerals and coastal fisheries cropped up at the time I was 
researching this paper, and ended up rejigging the hypothesis 
to read: Is it true or false that international relations has 
greater influence on the state than internal affairs?  The short 
reply is in Tonga’s circumstance, it is indeed true. 
A senior cabinet minister with considerable clout in 
government; a high-ranking noble persuasive in effecting the 
nobility’s collective stance; and the one Tongan politician of 
the landed gentry confident and capable to respond to 
problems, uncertainties, pokes, and probes I jostled at him, he 
never defaulted on tendering an answer.  Ma’afu has given a 
lot to me in the four years I have known him as a minister; a 
lot to mill through, pick at, interrogate, make sense of, and 
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publish; a lot of time, care, and thought explaining why 
government policy ought to travel this route; not feeding me 
shallow propaganda that I would see straight through and 
blast him for. 
This is not to say I have stood in out-and-out agreement 
with Ma’afu’s ministerial policies.  The Government of Tonga’s 
endorsement of seabed mineral exploration and exploitation at 
high seas provoked a volley of heated and quarrelsome 
exchanges between me and the Minister for Lands and Natural 
Resources, which I have written in detail and published 
(Brown Pulu, 2013a).  To this day, I am not convinced seabed 
minerals is a fail-safe income earner for Tonga; nor does this 
small island developing state have sure-fire protection against 
liability for environmental loss and damage caused by deep 
sea mining companies.  But enough trust and respect for one 
another’s views, no matter how divergent, has been 
reciprocated between us for me to at least hear the minister 
out, listen conscientiously to the policy rationalisation, and 
study the reasoning earnestly. 
In all probability, it is befitting that I close my collection of 
seventeen essays published on Tongan politics and society 
during the Tu’ivakano government from 2010 to 2014 with a 
Ma’afu oriented paper.  That was the way I began in 2012 by 
penning Ma’afu’s Word is in the Hills, and that is how I feel 
somewhat duty-bound to conclude.   
I told Ma’afu that this would be the last paper I author on 
Tonga before Election Day arrives on November 27th 2014.  
Then again, who really knows, as when it comes to making 
predictions about how this small island development state 
goes about patching up rising seas greedily gulping coral 
islands, and sorting out an epidemic spread of parliamentary 
chaos, an intricate story waits to unfurl. 
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Lord Ma’afu of Vaini and Tokomololo, head of the Ha’a 
Havea Lahi, and Minister for Lands and Natural Resources 
at the Government of Tonga.  Photograph taken at Vaini 
village in Tonga’s central district by Teena Brown Pulu, 
2011. 
If I made one observation as a researcher about the 
tumultuous give-and-take relationship grown over four years 
of getting to know the noble politician and Minister for Lands 
and Natural Resources Lord Ma’afu, and how he operates in 
national and regional politics, then it is this.  He has never 
told me to quit writing about Tonga, even when I fired scathing 
criticism at his conservative upper-class mindset, and the 
hard-line manoeuvring he used to get his way in cabinet and 
parliament to go charging after seabed mining, because a 
writer must write.   
So too must a politician demonstrate his abilities, or in 
Ma’afu’s case engage in real politik, power politics.  That is 
what we do in the world, and there is no need whatsoever to 
cancel one another out.  My long-suffering hope shared by 
many Tongans is that parliamentarians from the commoner 
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class can politically mature to learn this lesson well, and 
practice its ethic. 
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